Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

8-12-2016

An Analysis of Farm-Level Performance of Shallow Loss Products
based on Aggregated Farm Yields Case Study of the Stacked
Income Protection Plan (STAX)
Lauriane Senade Massan Yehouenou

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Yehouenou, Lauriane Senade Massan, "An Analysis of Farm-Level Performance of Shallow Loss Products
based on Aggregated Farm Yields Case Study of the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX)" (2016).
Theses and Dissertations. 457.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/457

This Graduate Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

Template C v3.0 (beta): Created by J. Nail 06/2015

An analysis of farm-level performance of shallow loss products based on aggregated farm
yields: case study of the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX)

By
TITLE PAGE
Lauriane Senade Massan Yehouenou

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Science
in Agricultural Economics
in the Department of Agricultural Economics
Mississippi State, Mississippi
August 2016

Copyright by
COPYRIGHT PAGE
Lauriane Senade Massan Yehouenou
2016

An analysis of farm-level performance of shallow loss products based on aggregated farm
yields: case study of the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX)
By
APPROVAL PAGE
Lauriane Senade Massan Yehouenou
Approved:
____________________________________
Barry J. Barnett
(Major Professor)
____________________________________
Keith H. Coble
(Committee Member)
____________________________________
Ardian Harri
(Committee Member / Graduate Coordinator)
____________________________________
George M. Hopper
Dean
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences

Name: Lauriane Senade Massan Yehouenou
ABSTRACT
Date of Degree: August 12, 2016
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Agricultural Economics
Major Professor: Barry J. Barnett
Title of Study: An analysis of farm-level performance of shallow loss products based on
aggregated farm yields: case study of the Stacked Income Protection Plan
(STAX)
Pages in Study 103
Candidate for Degree of Master of Science
The STAX and SCO shallow loss crop insurance products were introduced in the
2014 farm bill. This research investigates the farm-level performance of STAX for cotton
growers. Using 10 years of actual farm yield data for the period 1999 to 2008, certainty
equivalent gains were evaluated under four treatments in Texas, Mississippi and
Louisiana for non-irrigated and irrigated cotton production. Following the current
practice for STAX, county yield is estimated using yield data from YP, RP, and RP-HPE
policies rather than NASS county level yield data. Findings show that, assuming
actuarially-fair premiums, certainty equivalent gains for RP tend to be higher than for
STAX. But with subsidized premiums, the opposite outcome sometimes occurs.
Furthermore, with subsidized premiums the findings indicate that almost all farms would
benefit from purchasing STAX as a complement to RP. The use of actual farm yield data
highlights the heterogeneity of STAX farm-level impacts.

DEDICATION
Nothing worth having comes easy.

This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty who has guided me through this journey.
I also dedicate this research to my beloved parents (Alphonse and Pascaline) and my
wonderful sisters (Carolle, Dolores and Adriana) whose love, encouragement and prayers
enable me to complete this work.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work would not have been complete without the invaluable assistance of the
following persons:
Dr. Barry J. Barnett, my major professor and a great mentor, for giving me the
opportunity to work on this topic and guiding me throughout the process. It is also a
genuine pleasure for me to express my deep gratitude for him and his family for their
endless support since my first day in Starkville. Thank you.
Dr. Ardian Harri and Keith Coble, my committee members, for their guidance and
constructive criticisms and suggestions during this project.
Katie and David Buys, a wonderful family, for their kindness and care throughout
the duration of my program.
It is also my duty to record my thankfulness to all my professors and the
department of Agricultural Economics’ faculty and staff members. Special thanks to Dr.
Steve Turner, Dr. Daniel Petrolia and Debra Price. I profusely thank my graduate
colleagues and friends for their support and friendship.
Finally, it is my privilege to acknowledge my parents and sisters for their
unconditional and endless love and support.
Above all, I thank the Almighty God, the source of all knowledge and wisdom for
his gracefulness toward me. I owe you all I am and have.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7

II.

Background................................................................................................1
Shallow-loss Area-level Insurance Products .............................................2
Alternative Estimates of County-level Yields ...........................................3
2015 STAX participation ..........................................................................5
Objectives ..................................................................................................7
Potential Users...........................................................................................7
Organization of the study ..........................................................................7

DESCRIPTION OF THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM ..............................9
2.1

Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP)...................................................9
2.1.1 Farm level Insurance .........................................................................10
2.1.2 Area level Insurance ..........................................................................13
2.2
Federal Farm Programs ...........................................................................16
2.3
“Shallow Loss” Programs........................................................................17
III.

LITTERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................24
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8

Asymmetric Information in Farm Level Insurance .................................24
Environmental Implications of Farm Level Insurance ............................25
Decomposing Farm Level Yield Risk .....................................................27
Basis Risk ................................................................................................27
Comparing the Performance of Farm Level and Area Level
Insurance Products...................................................................................28
Optimal Area Based Insurance ................................................................29
Empirical Studies of Area Level Insurance Performance .......................32
Comparing Farm and Area Yield Variability..........................................34
iv

3.9
IV.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................37
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.1

V.

Data..........................................................................................................46
Empirical model ......................................................................................47

RESULTS............................................................................................................52
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6

VII.

Expected Utility Model ...........................................................................37
Risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk loving..........................................40
Risk aversion and wealth.........................................................................41
Implication for this study.........................................................................43

DATA AND METHODS ....................................................................................46
5.1
5.2

VI.

Shallow Loss Area Level Products..........................................................35

Initial treatment .......................................................................................52
CRRA=3 treatment..................................................................................56
80% RP treatment....................................................................................57
Subsidy treatment ....................................................................................58
Summary of empirical findings ...............................................................59
Explanation of the variation of STAX performance ...............................61

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................85

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 89
APPENDIX
A.

SYNTHESIS TABLES .......................................................................................93

B.

FIGURES

99

v

LIST OF TABLES
1.1

Participation in STAX for 2015 Crop Year, By State and Total US................6

2.1

Overview of US Crop Insurance Program......................................................16

6.1

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 ..........................63

6.2

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 ..........................64

6.3

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 ..........................65

6.4

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 .........................................66

6.5

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 ..........................67

6.6

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0 ..........................68

6.7

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ...................69

6.8

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ...................70

6.9

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ...................71
vi

6.10

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ..................................72

6.11

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ...................73

6.12

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0 ...................74

6.13

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................75

6.14

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................76

6.15

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana NonIrrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................77

6.16

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................78

6.17

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................79

6.18

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection,
STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana
Irrigated Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and
subsidized (S) premiums ................................................................................80

6.19

Average of difference between subsidized 80% RP and subsidized
70% RP layered with subsidized STAX across state and per irrigation
practice. ..........................................................................................................81
vii

6.20

Average farm-county yield correlation in Texas for Non- Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking......................................82

6.21

Average farm-county yield correlation in Mississippi for NonIrrigated cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking.......................82

6.22

Average farm-county yield correlation in Louisiana for Non- Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking......................................83

6.23

Average farm-county yield correlation in Texas for Irrigated cotton
based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking.................................................83

6.24

Average farm-county yield correlation in Mississippi for Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking......................................84

6.25

Average farm-county yield correlation in Louisiana for Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking......................................84

A.1

Number of observations per county per state for Non-irrigated Cotton.........94

A.2

Number of observations per county per state for irrigated Cotton.................96

A.3

Synthesis of the different treatments for Non-irrigated Cotton in each
state.................................................................................................................97

A.4

Synthesis of the different treatments for irrigated Cotton in each state .........98

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
B.1

Counties location and number of observations in Texas for nonirrigated Cotton.............................................................................................100

B.2

Counties location and number of observations in Texas for irrigated
Cotton ...........................................................................................................100

B.3

Counties location and number of observations in Mississippi for nonirrigated Cotton.............................................................................................101

B.4

Counties location and number of observations in Mississippi for
irrigated Cotton.............................................................................................101

B.5

Counties location and number of observations in Louisiana for nonirrigated Cotton.............................................................................................102

B.6

Counties location and number of observations in Louisiana for
irrigated Cotton.............................................................................................102

B.7

STAX Certainty equivalent changes for Non-irrigated cotton in Texas
under the initial treatment.............................................................................103

ix

INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains the problem statement and the objectives of the study. It
also presents at the end the organization of the thesis.
1.1

Background
The American agricultural industry highly depends on crop insurance which is an

important tool for risk management. In 2014, more than 294 million acres of farmland
were protected through the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) (National Crop
Insurance Services, 2015). In the United States, the crop insurance program is overseen
and administered by the Risk Management Agency (RMA), on behalf of the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation under the Federal Crop Insurance Act. RMA works with private
sector companies that sell and service policies. Crop insurance is made affordable to a
majority of famers by the federal government which subsidizes premiums to reduce costs
to farmers and provides reimbursement to insurance companies to offset operating and
administrative costs.
For most major field crops, the FCIP offers two types of insurance: yield-based or
revenue-based. Crop insurance products can also be offered at the farm-level or the arealevel. Yield-based, farm-level insurance provides an indemnity when the actual farm
yield falls below the guarantee level (known as the trigger yield). This insurance product
is known as Yield Protection (YP). Revenue-based, farm-level insurance provides an
1

indemnity when an estimate of farm-level revenue (actual yield × a futures market price)
falls below the revenue guarantee (known as the trigger revenue). The FCIP offers two

types of farm-level revenue insurance. The Revenue Protection (RP) product allows the
dollar amount of insurance protection (known as the liability) to increase if price
increases during the growing season. For the Revenue Protection with the Harvest Price
Exclusion (RP-HPE) product, liability does not increase if price increases during the
growing season.
Yield-based, area-level insurance provides an indemnity when the estimated
county average yield falls below the trigger yield for the county. This insurance product
is known as Area Yield Protection (AYP). Revenue-based, area-level insurance provides
an indemnity when the estimated county average revenue falls below the trigger revenue
for the county. This insurance product is known as Area Revenue Protection (ARP). A
harvest price exclusion version of ARP (ARP-HPE) is also available.
1.2

Shallow-loss Area-level Insurance Products
The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) increased funding for crop insurance by an

additional $5.7 billion over 10 years. This increase was mainly due to two new insurance
products: the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) which is available only for cotton
and the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) which is available for cotton and other
crops. Both STAX and SCO are considered shallow loss products because they are
designed to provide area-based coverage for a portion of the deductible on the underlying
farm-level YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy. The amount of SCO coverage depends on the
coverage level and approved yield for the underlying policy. STAX is similar to SCO but
is available only for producers of cotton. SCO covers from 86% of the expected area
2

revenue down to the producer’s underlying insurance coverage level. STAX covers a
layer from 90% of expected county revenue down to the higher of 70% or the producer’s
underlying insurance coverage level. SCO is yield-based or revenue-based depending on
whether the underlying policy is yield insurance or revenue insurance while STAX is
always revenue-based. SCO purchasers must have an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE
policy whereas this is not required for STAX purchasers. Premium subsidies are
respectively 65% and 80% for SCO and STAX.
Area-level products have existed since the early 1990s (Skees, Black, and Barnett
1997). However, growers have previously had to choose either a farm-level product or an
area-level product. The same acreage could not be insured with more than one policy.
With the 2014 farm bill introducing the shallow loss products, two crop insurance
policies can be purchased for the same acreage: (i) an underlying farm-level YP or RP
policy; and (ii) a shallow loss, area-level Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) or
Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) policy.
1.3

Alternative Estimates of County-level Yields
Previously, the area-based insurance products administered by the RMA

depended on the availability of county yield estimates from USDA’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). Yet, NASS does not report yield data for every
county where a crop is produced – although yield data for the crop may still be available
at a higher level of aggregation (e.g., the crop reporting district or state levels). Thus,
limited availability of NASS county yield estimates restricted the counties where areabased insurance products could be offered.
3

In addition, in recent years, NASS has significantly reduced the number of
counties for which yield estimates are reported. Dismukes et al. (2013) stated that this
reduction in the counties where NASS reports county yields could make the
implementation of area-based programs such as SCO and STAX more difficult. While
the lack of NASS yield data would affect all SCO and STAX crops, it is particularly
problematic for cotton since, as a result of the 2014 farm bill, STAX is the primary
mechanism for providing federal support to cotton producers.
Though STAX and SCO are area-based insurance, they will be offered wherever
YP or RP are offered. Thus, rather than having some STAX and SCO policies based on
NASS yield data and other STAX and SCO policies based on another estimator of county
yield (due to a lack of NASS county yield estimates), RMA decided to move away from
basing area yield insurance products on NASS data. Instead, yield data collected from
underlying YP and RP policies will be used to generate a unique county yield estimate
that will serve as the basis for RMA administered area yield insurance products.
NASS county yield estimates are based primarily on grower responses to surveys.
The samples used for the surveys are randomized and stratified. The population of
farmers varies across counties. As a result, in counties with fewer farms, the surveys are
creating a “response-fatigue” since farmers are surveyed frequently. NASS also uses field
plots in some areas to collect yield data. A comparison between the estimated production
from the survey and the volume of sales in the region is sometimes used to verify the
reported yield data.
RMA county yield estimates are now based on aggregating yield data provided by
YP, RP, and RP-HPE purchasers in the county. Growers who purchase insurance in year t
4

are required to provide documentation of yields in years t-1 through t-10. False reports
can lead to criminal prosecution. Thus, the year t-1 yields reported when purchasing YP,
RP, or RP-HPE insurance in year t can be aggregated and used to estimate county yield
for year t-1. This county yield estimate is then used to settle year t-1 area-based AYP,
ARP, ARP-HPE, SCO, or STAX policies.
However, the sample of YP, RP, and RP-HPE purchasers in a county is neither
randomized nor stratified. Moreover, while nationally YP, RP, and RP-HPE purchasing is
quite high (in excess of 80 percent of planted acres for corn, soybeans, cotton and wheat),
there is considerable variability at the county level. In other words, there are counties
with few purchasers of farm-level crop insurance products.
1.4

2015 STAX participation
Due to the high premium subsidy of STAX (80%), most analysts expected cotton

growers to purchase STAX. But in 2015, numbers prove the contrary. According to
USDA-Risk Management Agency data, in 2015, only 2.35 million acres of cotton were
insured under STAX. This was only 28 percent of the NASS estimate of cotton planted
acres and only 30.7 percent of the total insured cotton acreage in the United States. In
some states, STAX participation was even lower. For instance, in Texas, which
accounted for more than half of all planted and insured cotton acres, STAX was
purchased on only 19 percent of cotton planted acres and 21 percent of insured acres.
Such low levels of participation suggest that many cotton growers were not convinced
that they would benefit from purchasing STAX.

5

Table 1.1

Participation in STAX for 2015 Crop Year, By State and Total US
Acres
Planted

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Florida
Georgia
Kansas
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
New
Mexico
North
Carolina
Oklahoma
South
Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Total US

315,000
85,000
210,000
47,000
85,000
1,120,000
16,000
110,000
320,000
185,000
35,000

Estimated
Acres
Insured*
284,623
93,795
193,215
48,745
76,281
1,029,371
12,872
105,008
313,385
182,901
34,598

385,000

%
Insured

STAX
Acres**

90.4%
110.3%
92.0%
105.8%
89.7%
91.9%
80.5%
95.5%
97.9%
98.9%
98.9%

166,965
55,663
48,123
1,870
49,023
450,016
45,044
138,715
26,298
3,525

Planted
%
STAX**
53.0%
65.5%
22.9%
4.0%
57.7%
40,2%
0.0%
40.9%
43.3%
14.2%
10.1%

Insured
%
STAX***
58.7%
59.3%
24.9%
3.8%
64.3%
43.7%
0.0%
42.9%
44.3%
14.4%
10.2%

358,997

93.2%

173,968

45.2%

48.5%

210,000
235,000

154,970
222,420

73.8%
94.6%

93,784
87,680

44.7%
37.3%

60.5%
39.4%

155,000
4,800,000
85,000
8,398,000

166,609
4,295,706
78,362
7,652,858

107.5%
89.5%
92.2%
91.1%

44,508
913,289
50,116
2,348,587

28.7%
19.0%
59.0%
28.0%

26.7%
21.3%
64.0%
30.7%

*Source: USDA, Crop Production, September 11, 2015. If a state shows acres insured
being greater than acres planted, this could likely be the result of prevented planting
acres**acres insured and receiving prevented planting credit but not planted.
**Source: USDA-Risk Management Agency, “Summary of Business”, 11/23/2015.
http://www.rma.usda.goc/data/sob.html Acres insured is Total Cotton Acres insured shown in the
SoB, which includes STAX acres, minus acres reported as insured with STAX. STAX
may be purchased as a stand-alone policy so this subtraction likely underestimates total
acres insured.
***Acres insured with STAX as a percent of acres planted and as a percent of acres
insured.
The research presented here evaluates the farm-level effectiveness of STAX for

cotton producers in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. As opposed to previous studies on
area-level insurance products which used NASS county yield data, this study employs
county-level yield estimates that are calculated by aggregating the farm-level yields of
YP, RP, and RP-HPE purchasers in the county, as RMA is now doing with STAX, SCO,
6

and other area-based products. Furthermore, whereas representative farms are often used
to analyze federal agricultural programs, this analysis uses actual farm-level yield data
which allows one to observe the heterogeneity of STAX effectiveness across farms in a
county.
1.5

Objectives
This study analyzes the farm-level performance of STAX for cotton growers in

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas assuming that county yield is estimated using RMA
yield data from YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies rather than NASS county level yield data.
The specific objectives are:

1.6

1.

To assess the farm-level welfare impacts (measured as changes in the
certainty equivalent) of STAX both as a substitute for RP and as a
complement to RP;

2.

To determine the extent to which the farm-level welfare impacts of STAX
are due to the premium subsidy rather than risk protection; and

3.

To analyze the heterogeneity of farm-level STAX performance among
farms within a county.

Potential Users
The potential users of the results of this study include, the Risk Management

Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture, crop producers, marketing
advisors, banks or other financial institutions lending to growers, agricultural insurance
companies and agricultural economists investigating insurance and shallow loss products’
performance.
1.7

Organization of the study
This chapter contains background information, the problem statement and

objectives for this study. Chapter II contains a description of the FCIP and various FCIP
7

insurance policies and detailed information about how indemnities are calculated for
various crop insurance products. Chapter III presents a literature review on various
aspects of the FCIP. Chapter IV discusses the conceptual framework based on expected
utility, risk aversion theories and certainty equivalent gains. The main assumptions made
for the study are explained in this chapter. Chapter V describes the data and explains the
methods and procedures used in the study especially the sampling density and model
simulation. Chapter VI contains the empirical results and Chapter VII provides
conclusions and implications.
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CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTION OF THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM
2.1

Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP)
The FCIP started in 1938 when Congress created the Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation to help agriculture recover from the combined effects of the Great
Depression and the Dust Bowl. In 1996, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) was
created to administer the program under the Federal Crop Insurance Act (Risk
Management Agency, 2015). The current program addresses crop yield and/or revenue
losses for about 130 crops. In 2014, FCIP policies covered 294 million acres with corn,
cotton, soybeans, and wheat accounting for more than 70 percent of the total insured
acres (Shields, 2015).
The implementation of the program occurs through a partnership between the
federal government and the private sector. The private sector is represented by several
private insurance companies which sell insurance products. Their losses are partially
reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and their administrative and
operating costs are reimbursed by the federal government. Insured farmers have a crop
insurance contract with their insurance providers; which is renewed each year unless
cancelled.
Insured farmers choose a level of coverage. Premiums are subsidized by the
federal government so insureds pay only a portion of the premium. The premium subsidy
9

percentage generally increases as the coverage level decreases. In 2014, the federal
premium subsidy averaged about 62 percent of the total premium (implying that, on
average, insured growers paid only about 38 percent of the total premium cost). In 2014,
Federal crop insurance covered nearly $110 billion of liability across all crops (excluding
livestock) and total premium was $10.1 billion of which $6.2 billion was paid by federal
premium subsidies while premiums for producers totaled $3.9 billion (Shields, 2015).
2.1.1

Farm level Insurance
The most common farm level crop insurance policies are Yield Protection (YP),

Revenue Protection (RP), and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (RPHPE). Guarantees for these three farm level insurance products are based on the “Actual
Production History” (APH) yield. The APH is the average of annual crop yields (usually
stated on a bushel-per-acre basis) for the last 4 to 10 years on the insured unit. If the
insured unit has less than four successive years of actual yield records, a transition or Tyield is used to establish an APH yield. A T-yield is a crop-, county-, and practicespecific estimate of the expected yield in the county. More specifically, if fewer than 4
years of yield records are available, the missing years are replaced with 65 percent, 80
percent, 90 percent, and 100 percent of the T-yield respectively, if the grower has no
actual yield records, one year of yield records, two years of yield records, and three years
of yield records. The APH is then calculated as the simple 4 year average of any actual
yield records and any replacement yields where the replacement yields are the
appropriate percentage of the T-yield (Crop Insurance Handbook, 2015).
YP covers producers against yield losses due to natural causes such as drought,
excessive moisture, hail, wind, frost, insects, and disease. Producers choose the coverage
10

level (from 50 percent to 85 percent) and the price selection (between 55 percent and 100
percent of the projected crop price). The product of the APH yield and the coverage level
is the yield guarantee (or trigger yield). If the actual yield is less than the trigger yield,
per acre indemnity is paid equal to the product of the yield shortfall and the price
selection. The maximum possible indemnity that can be paid by the policy is the liability.
The YP liability per acre for insured unit i assuming a 100 percent share is:

where

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇

(2.1)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 .

(2.2)

Approved yield is a measure of the expected yield on the insured unit based on the APH
yield. Projected Price is determined by pre-planting time prices on a harvest futures
contract for the crop.
The indemnity per acre for YP is calculated as:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚�0, (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 )� × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 (2.3)

where Yield to Count is the realized yield on the insured unit.

Assume producer A farms 100 acres and has a 100 percent share of the crop
produced. If the coverage level is 85 percent and the approved yield is 100 bushels per
acre, then the trigger yield per acre equals: 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × 85% =

85 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. If the actual yield (or realized yield) is 70 bushels per acre and the

projected price $4.00, the indemnity per acre is: (85 − 70) × $4.00 = $60; or $6,000 for
the whole farm.

RP and RP-HPE are both revenue insurance products protecting against revenue
shortfalls. RP-HPE is considered as a standard revenue insurance because it is only based
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on the projected price whereas RP has the ability to increase the trigger revenue if prices
increase during the growing season. For RP-HPE, the trigger revenue is the product of the
coverage level selected by the insured and the expected revenue (the product of the APH
yield and the projected price).
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇

(2.4)

For RP, the trigger revenue is the same formula with the difference that expected
revenue can depend on either projected price or harvest price. The projected price and the
actual harvest price are derived from futures market prices.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)

(2.5)

For both RP-HPE and RP, when the actual revenue (product of actual yield and

harvest price) is less than the trigger revenue, the per acre indemnity is paid equal to the
difference between the trigger revenue and the actual revenue:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 �0, �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − (𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 × 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)��

(2.6)

Assume the projected price (February futures price) is $4.00, the approved yield
100 bushels per acre and the coverage chosen is 85 percent. Thus the trigger revenue for
the RP-HPE is: $4.00 × 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × 85% = $340 per acre. The RP trigger revenue
will increase if the futures price increases from February to harvest (say December). If

the December future prices declines to $3.50 at harvest and the actual yield (or yield to
Count) is 70 bushels per acre, the indemnity per acre will be the same for RP-HPE and
RP: $340 − (70 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × $3.50) = $95. However, if the December futures prices

increases to $5.00 then the RP-HPE indemnity is zero: max{0, ($4.00 × 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 ×

85%) − ($5.00 × 70 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏)} = max(0, −$10) = $0; and the RP indemnity is $75:

max{0, ($5.00 × 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × 85%) − ($5.00 × 70 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏)} = max(0, $75) = $75.
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2.1.2

Area level Insurance
As for the farm level, the most common area based insurance products are Area

Yield Protection (AYP), Area Revenue Protection (ARP) and Area Revenue Protection
with the Harvest Price Exclusion (ARP-HPE).
AYP (formerly Group Risk Plan or GRP) is the area-level yield based insurance.
AYP insures against losses based on the county average yield. The coverage levels
available are Catastrophic Risk Protection (CAT) at 65 percent of the expected county
yield and 45 percent of the projected price, and additional coverage of 70 percent-90
percent (in 5 percent increments) of the expected county yield. Indemnities are triggered
when the county yield for the insured crop falls below the trigger level selected by the
farmer. Payments are made regardless of the individual farmer’s actual yield. Assuming
100 percent share, the liability, the trigger yield and indemnity per acre for an insured
unit i are as followed:
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇

(2.7)

where protection factor is the percentage (80 percent to 120 percent in 1 percent
increment) chosen by the grower to calculate the liability.
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

(2.8)

with coverage ranging from 70 percent to 90 percent in 5 percent increments. .
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = �

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�0,(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 −𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 )�

�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 −(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)�

� × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

(2.9)

where loss limit factor represents the percentage of the expected county yield at which no
additional indemnity is payable. Typically it has a value of 0.18. This implies that if the
expected county yield is 100 bushels then no additional indemnity is paid if the yield falls
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below 18 bushels. The total indemnity will never be more than 100 percent of the
liability.
If the coverage level is 90 percent, the expected county yield 100 bushels per acre,
the projected price $5.00, the protection factor 100 percent, the loss limit factor 0.18 and
the realized county yield (or yield to county) is 80 bushels. The liability per acre is:
100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × $5.00 × 100% = $500. The trigger yield is: 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × 90% =
90 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏. The indemnity per acre is:

(90 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 − 80 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏)
�
� × $500 = $69.44.
(90 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 − (100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × 0.18)

ARP (formerly Group Risk Income Protection or GRIP) and ARP-HPE are arealevel revenue insurance. Indemnities are paid only when the average county revenue for
the insured crop falls below the trigger revenue selected by the farmer. Coverage levels
are available from 70 percent to 90 percent, in 5 percent increments, of the county
revenue. Unlike ARP-HPE, ARP also includes upside harvest price protection, which
increases the policy protection or liability at the end of the insurance period if the harvest
price is greater than the projected price and if there is a production loss. For insured unit
i, indemnity per acre for ARP-HPE is calculated as shown below:
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 (2.10)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = �

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�0,�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 −(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ×𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)��

(2.11)

�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 −(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇×𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)�

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

For the ARP, the indemnity per acre calculation is slightly different due to

inclusion of the harvest price in the formulas:
14

�×

(2.12)

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × max(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) ×

𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇

(2.13)

𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

(2.14)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × max (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) ×
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = �

max�0,�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 −(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ×𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)��

�×

�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 −(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×max(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇,𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)×𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)�

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

(2.15)

Following the previous example (with the AYP), assume a harvest price of $5.50.

For the ARP-HPE, the liability is $500. The trigger revenue is: 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × $5.00 ×
90% = $450. The indemnity per acre is:
max�0,�$450−(80 𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿×$5.50)��

� �$450−(100

𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿×$5.00×0.18)�

$10

� × $500 = �$360 × $500� = $13.89.

The harvest price being higher than the projected price, the liability for ARP will
increase: liability = 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × max($5.00, $5.50) × 100% = $550. The trigger

revenue is: 100 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 × max($5.00, $5.50) × 90% = $495. The indemnity per acre
max�0,�$495−(80 𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿×$5.50)��

is: ��$495−(100

𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿×max($5.00,$5.50)×0.18)�

$55

� × $550 = �$396 × $550� = $76.39.

When the average county revenue (𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌) ×

𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) is higher than the trigger revenue, there is no indemnity payment.
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Table 2.1

Overview of US Crop Insurance Program

Farm-level

Area-Level

2.2

Yield-based
Yield Protection (YP)

Revenue-based
Revenue Protection (RP)
Revenue Protection with
Harvest Price Exclusion (RPHPE).
Area Yield Protection (AYP) Area Revenue Protection
(ARP)
Area Revenue Protection
with the Harvest Price
Exclusion (ARP-HPE)

Federal Farm Programs
The federal farm programs are a set of congressionally authorized programs that

provide federal transfers to farmers. U.S federal farm programs were first enacted during
the 1930s in the New Deal era, beginning with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
(Edwards, 2009). Over the past eight decades, the features of farm programs have
changed but their principal objective of providing financial support for U.S. crop farmers
remains the same. Mainly ten crops are considered in those programs: wheat, corn,
sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, rice, soybeans, minor oilseeds, and peanuts. According to
the Environmental Working Group (EWG), USDA has paid to the United States
$292.5 billion in agricultural subsidies from 1995 to 2012 for farm programs (EWG,
2012). There have been many different types of federal farm programs since the 1930s
with various changes along the years. The 2014 farm bill eliminated some of these
programs (direct payments and the counter-cyclical payment program) and replaced them
with SCO and STAX shallow loss programs.
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2.3

“Shallow Loss” Programs
The Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) is an add-on to crop insurance that

provides an area-based insurance for the underlying insurance policy’s deductible. It must
be purchased as an endorsement to an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy. If the
underlying policy is yield based (revenue based), SCO provides yield coverage (revenue
coverage). Regardless of the coverage level of the underlying policy, the Federal
Government pays 65 percent of the SCO premium cost. The liability is based on the farm
level (Actual Production History) yield while the indemnity is paid based on the county
level (area based) yield. SCO covers a layer from 86% of the expected area yield or
revenue down to the producer’s underlying insurance coverage level. For example, if the
farmer purchased Yield Protection (YP) insurance at the 65% coverage level, SCO covers
losses between 86% and 65% of the county’s expected yield. As with other crop
insurance products, the projected and realized crop prices are based on futures markets
prices. The indemnity per acre with SCO depends on the underlying policy.
•

SCO with Yield Protection

For insured unit i, liability per acre is calculated as
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × (86% − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇%)

(2.16)

where Approved Yield is based on the actual production history (APH) yield of the
insured unit. Coverage is the coverage for the underlying crop insurance policy.
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 = 86% × 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌

(2.17)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌−𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌−(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇×𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)� , 1� , 0� ×

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

(2.18)
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where Yield to Count is the actual or realized county yield.

•

SCO with Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (RP-HPE)

For insured unit i, liability per acre is calculated as
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × (86% − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇%)

(2.19)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 86% × 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 (2.20)

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡×𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)

𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇×𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)� , 1� , 0� ×

(2.21)

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

Consider the example of a farmer with a yield protection (YP) policy at a 75

percent coverage level as the underlying insurance product. The approved yield based on
the Actual Production History (APH) yield on the insured unit is 80 bushels per acre and
the expected county yield is 100 bushels per acre with an actual county yield (yield to
count) of 85 bushels per acre. The projected price is $4.00 per bushel. SCO would offer
county yield protection and trigger payments if the actual county yield fell below 86
bushels per acre (86% × 100 = 86). The SCO liability is (80 bushels × $4.00 per bushel ×
(86% - 75%)) or $35.20 per acre. SCO indemnity will be based on the amount of this
SCO liability and the percentage loss at the county level:
(86%×100)−85

𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �(86%×100)−(75%×100)� , 1� , 0� × $35.2 = 0.09 × $35.2 = $3.17

per acre. Assume the

farmer actual farm yield (yield to Count) is 70 bushels per acre. The farmer will receive
no indemnity on the underlying YP policy because the actual farm yield (70 bushels per
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acre) is greater than the YP trigger yield (75% x 80 = 60 bushels per acre) but will
receive an indemnity on the SCO shallow loss policy.
Consider another example with a projected price of $4.50 per bushel and a harvest
price of $4.55 per bushels. For this example, the expected county yield is 70 bushels per
acre. The approved farm yield is 75 bushels per acre with a coverage of 70 percent. When
coupled with RP-HPE, the maximum SCO payment per acre (or liability) is $54 (75 ×
$4.50 × (86% - 70%) = $54) and SCO will trigger an indemnity if actual county revenue
is less than $270.90 per acre (70 × $4.50 × 86% = $270.90). With an actual county yield
of 50 bushels per acre, this will result in a SCO indemnity of $46.44 per acre:
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

$270.9−(50×$4.55)

� , 1� , 0� × $54 = 0.86 × $54 = $46.44.

$270.9−(70%×70×$4.50)

With the RP policy, the difference in SCO payment outcomes (compared to SCO
payment with RP-HPE) occurs only when the harvest price is above the projected price.
Thus, with the same example above, when coupled with RP, SCO liability is $54.6 (75 ×
$4.55 × (86% - 70%) = $54.60), the SCO trigger revenue is $273.91 per acre (70 × $4.55
× 86% = $273.91) and the SCO indemnity $49.69 per acre
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

$273.91−(50×$4.55)

$273.91−(70%×70×$4.55)

� , 1� , 0� × $54.60 = 0.91 × $54.60 = $49.69.

The Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) is similar to SCO but available only
for cotton growers. Unlike SCO, it may be purchased without individual level coverage
or as a “companion policy” for YP, RP, and RP-HPE. The Federal government subsidizes
80 percent of the premium cost for STAX. STAX provides coverage for up to 20 percent
of the expected area revenue in increments of 5, 10, 15 or 20 percent. The amount of
STAX liability depends on the expected county yield (rather than the approved yield on
19

an underlying policy as with SCO), projected price, coverage range, and protection
factor. An indemnity is triggered when area revenue falls below 90 percent of its
expected level. As such, STAX coverage would begin at 90% (rather than 86%) and
would extend down to the greater of 70% or the coverage on the underlying YP, RP, or
RP-HPE policy. For example, if the farmer purchased Yield Protection (YP) insurance at
the 65% coverage level, STAX covers losses between 90% and 70% of the county’s
expected yield. STAX is only revenue (not yield) based.
•

SCO with Revenue Protection (RP)

For insured unit i, liability per acre is calculated as
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) ×

(2.22)

(86% − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇%)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 86% × 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × max(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =
max ��min �

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡×𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇×𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×max(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇,𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇))

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

(2.23)

� , 1� , 0� ×

(2.24)

Consider the example of a farmer with a yield protection (YP) policy at a 75

percent coverage level as the underlying insurance product. The approved yield based on
the Actual Production History (APH) yield on the insured unit is 80 bushels per acre and
the expected county yield is 100 bushels per acre with an actual county yield (yield to
count) of 85 bushels per acre. The projected price is $4.00 per bushel. SCO would offer
county yield protection and trigger payments if the actual county yield fell below 86
bushels per acre (86% × 100 = 86). The SCO liability is (80 bushels × $4.00 per bushel ×
(86% - 75%)) or $35.20 per acre. SCO indemnity will be based on the amount of this
20

SCO liability and the percentage loss at the county level:
(86%×100)−85

𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �(86%×100)−(75%×100)� , 1� , 0� × $35.2 = 0.09 × $35.2 = $3.17

per acre. Assume the

farmer actual farm yield (yield to Count) is 70 bushels per acre. The farmer will receive
no indemnity on the underlying YP policy because the actual farm yield (70 bushels per
acre) is greater than the YP trigger yield (75% x 80 = 60 bushels per acre) but will
receive an indemnity on the SCO shallow loss policy.
Consider another example with a projected price of $4.50 per bushel and a harvest
price of $4.55 per bushels. For this example, the expected county yield is 70 bushels per
acre. The approved farm yield is 75 bushels per acre with a coverage of 70 percent. When
coupled with RP-HPE, the maximum SCO payment per acre (or liability) is $54 (75 ×
$4.50 × (86% - 70%) = $54) and SCO will trigger an indemnity if actual county revenue
is less than $270.90 per acre (70 × $4.50 × 86% = $270.90). With an actual county yield
of 50 bushels per acre, this will result in a SCO indemnity of $46.44 per acre:
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

$270.9−(50×$4.55)

� , 1� , 0� × $54 = 0.86 × $54 = $46.44.

$270.9−(70%×70×$4.50)

With the RP policy, the difference in SCO payment outcomes (compared to SCO
payment with RP-HPE) occurs only when the harvest price is above the projected price.
Thus, with the same example above, when coupled with RP, SCO liability is $54.6 (75 ×
$4.55 × (86% - 70%) = $54.60), the SCO trigger revenue is $273.91 per acre (70 × $4.55
× 86% = $273.91) and the SCO indemnity $49.69 per acre
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

$273.91−(50×$4.55)

$273.91−(70%×70×$4.55)

� , 1� , 0� × $54.60 = 0.91 × $54.60 = $49.69.

The Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) is similar to SCO but available only
for cotton growers. Unlike SCO, it may be purchased without individual level coverage
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or as a “companion policy” for YP, RP, and RP-HPE. The Federal government subsidizes
80 percent of the premium cost for STAX. STAX provides coverage for up to 20 percent
of the expected area revenue in increments of 5, 10, 15 or 20 percent. The amount of
STAX liability depends on the expected county yield (rather than the approved yield on
an underlying policy as with SCO), projected price, coverage range, and protection
factor. An indemnity is triggered when area revenue falls below 90 percent of its
expected level. As such, STAX coverage would begin at 90% (rather than 86%) and
would extend down to the greater of 70% or the coverage on the underlying YP, RP, or
RP-HPE policy. For example, if the farmer purchased Yield Protection (YP) insurance at
the 65% coverage level, STAX covers losses between 90% and 70% of the county’s
expected yield. STAX is only revenue (not yield) based.
For insured unit i, liability per acre is calculated as
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) ×

(90% − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(70%, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇%)) × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇

(2.25)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 90% × 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡× 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (70%,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)×𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌×𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇,𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇))

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

(2.26)

� , 1� , 0� ×

(2.27)

Consider a farmer with a 100 percent share and an Actual Production History

(APH) cotton yield of 800 pounds per acre in a county with an expected county yield of
1,000 pounds per acre. The projected price is $0.60 per pound and the harvest price is
also $0.60 per pound. Assume the producer selects a 100 percent STAX Protection Factor
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and the 70 percent RP-HPE insurance coverage level. The actual county yield is 700
pounds per acre.
The expected county revenue is $600 ($0.60 × 1000 = $600). The revenue level
that would trigger a STAX indemnity is then calculated by multiplying the expected
county revenue by 90 percent ($600 × 90% = $540). The maximum STAX indemnity that
can be paid per acre is $120 ($600 × (90% - 70%) × 100% = $120). The STAX indemnity
$540−(700×$0.62)
paid in this example would be $105.6 per acre: 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �$540−(70%×$600)
� , 1� , 0� × $120 =

0.88 × $120 = $105.60.

Referring back to our example, if the harvest price were higher at $0.62 per pound

the STAX trigger revenue would adjust to $558 per acre ($0.62 × 1000 × 90% = $558).
The liability (maximum STAX indemnity) will increase to $124 ($0.62 × 1000 × (90% 70%) × 100% = $124). In this example, the STAX indemnity corresponds to the
maximum STAX indemnity:
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 ��𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �

$0.62×1000×90%−(700×$0.62)

$0.62×1000×90%−(70%×$0.62×1000)

� , 1� , 0� × $124 = 1 × $124 = $124.
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CHAPTER III
LITTERATURE REVIEW
Because they were just recently introduced, literature about the performance of
SCO and STAX is currently non-existent. However, there is an extensive literature on
area yield and revenue insurance programs.
3.1

Asymmetric Information in Farm Level Insurance
Many authors (Chambers 1989; Barnaby and Skees 1990; Miranda 1991;

Quiggin, Kiragiannis, and Stanton, 1994; Smith and Goodwin 1996; Coble et al. 1997;
Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 1999; Skees and Barnett 1999; Barnett 2000) have contended
that compared to farm-level policies, area policies are less susceptible to the asymmetric
information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection can occur
if hidden information exists regarding the probability and/or magnitude of loss. That is
the case when insureds are more informed of their own yield distributions than insurers.
As a result, producers whose expected indemnities are higher relative to premiums will
be more likely to purchase the insurance. Moral hazard can occur if insurance purchasers
engage in hidden actions. For instance, moral hazard can occur when producers change
their practices after purchasing insurance in order to increase the probability of collecting
an indemnity or increase the amount of the indemnity.
Studies suggest that underwriting losses for farm level FCIP products have been
high due, in part, to asymmetric information problems (Quiggin, Kiragiannis, and
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Stanton, 1993; Smith and Goodwin 1996; Coble et al. 1997; Just, Calvin, and Quiggin
1999; Barnett 2000). Farm level FCIP policies have been plagued by adverse selection
and moral hazard problems due to the use of individual farm yield in measuring yield
losses. Farmers have better information about their yield distribution than insurers and
can influence their yield distribution after the insurance is purchased (Wang et al. 1998).
Writing in 1999, Just, Calvin, and Quiggin argued that producers purchased farm level
crop insurance products due primarily to premium subsidies and asymmetric information
(adverse selection) incentives, rather than out of any real concern about risk management.
3.2

Environmental Implications of Farm Level Insurance
Several studies have examined the environmental impacts of farm level insurance.

Typically, the question asked in these studies is whether farm level crop insurance
purchasing stimulates more or less use of chemical inputs. Horowitz and Lichtenberg
(1993) investigated the effect of insurance purchasing on chemical use in the U.S.
Midwest. They found that the purchase of crop insurance causes farmers to increase their
use of chemical inputs. These findings were countered by Smith and Godwin (1996) who
found that moral hazard incentives lead insured farmers to use fewer agricultural
chemical inputs. The authors suggested that Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s model was
misspecified (“…a simultaneous equations structure rather than a recursive structure for
the estimation models.” p. 437) which led to an incorrect conclusion. Following Horowitz
and Lichtenberg and Smith and Goodwin, Mishra et al. (2005) examined the relationship
between fertilizer and pesticide input use decisions and revenue insurance purchase
decisions. They found that farmers who purchase revenue insurance tend to reduce their
use of fertilizer and pesticide inputs; confirming Smith and Goodwin’s findings.
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However, the magnitude of the reduction in fertilizer use was larger than that of
pesticides. As such, any improved environmental outcomes due to the purchase of
revenue insurance were largely attributable to reduced fertilizer applications.
These studies have contributed to the policy debate on the relationship between
farm level insurance purchasing and environmental outcomes. Yet, they did not
investigate the effect of moral hazard on crop production. Just and Calvin (1993)
examined production effects of moral hazard by comparing farm yield expectations and
realized yields. They interpreted a significant lower difference between realized yields
and yields expectations for insured farmers as evidence of moral hazard. Quiggin,
Kiragiannis, and Stanton (1993) conducted a theoretical and empirical analysis of moral
hazard and adverse selection using cross-sectional data. They found that insured farmers
tend to have lower average yields than uninsured farmers. Moreover, increasing
deductibles (reducing coverage levels) helps address the moral hazard problem but
increases the severity of the adverse selection problem. The authors also suggested that
adverse selection and moral hazard are easily assessed when the insurance policy is
actuarially fair. They acknowledged that the use of panel data will improve the reliability
of results. To counter this limitation, Coble et al. (1997) used an expected indemnity
approach to measure moral hazard in farm based crop insurance products with panel data.
They found that moral hazard affects crop insurance indemnities in poor production years
but in years with favorable growing conditions, the effect of moral hazard is not
significant. The authors also suggested that a cross-sectional analysis is inadequate when
conducting moral hazard research but rather panel data is more appropriate.
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3.3

Decomposing Farm Level Yield Risk
According to Bulut, Schnapp, and Collins (2011), systematic or “systemic” risk is

the common portion of underlying risk when losses among insurance units are positively
and spatially correlated. The nonsystemic risk which is also called “unsystematic” or
“idiosyncratic” risk is the risk of yield shortfalls due to the unique circumstances of an
individual farmer. Miranda (1991) highlighted the potential advantages of area yield
(compared to farm yield) insurance by using a framework which partitioned risk into
systemic and idiosyncratic components. The author decomposed farm yield deviations
from expectation into a systemic component measured by a coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 times the area

yield deviations from expectation and an idiosyncratic error term.
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.1)

The coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 measures the sensitivity of the farm yield deviations from

expectation to the area yield deviations from expectation. The lower the coefficient, the
more likely the farm was to prefer the farm level insurance to the area based insurance.
Miranda’s empirical findings suggested that area yield crop insurance would only
eliminate a portion of systemic yield risk while having no effect on the nonsystemic yield
risk.
3.4

Basis Risk
Various papers have compared the competitiveness – risk reduction – of area

yield insurance and farm yield insurance (Miranda 1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet
1994; Barnett et al. 2005). The primary shortcoming of area policies is that they are
subject to basis risk (Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997; Barnett et al. 2005; Deng, Barnett,
and Vedenov 2007). Basis risk is caused by less than perfect dependency between county
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yields and farm yields which means that farm level losses may not be fully covered by an
area-based insurance product. In other words, a farm can experience yield shortfall and
receive no area based indemnity. Likewise, the farm can also experience no yield
shortfall but receive an area based indemnity. Reducing basis risk is important when
designing area based products (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). With area-based
insurance products, the magnitude of individual yield risk reduction highly depends on
how well farm yield is correlated with area yield. Farm yields are more likely to be
highly correlated with county yield in areas with increased homogeneity of soil and
climatic conditions faced by producers (Miranda 1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet
1994; Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997). Generally, the more homogeneous the production
region, the lower the basis risk with area-based products. However, even in
heterogeneous productions regions, area based insurance products can be preferred to
farm based products if the farm based products are very expensive (Deng, Barnett, and
Vedenov, 2007).
Barnett et al. (2005) argued that farm based crop insurance products are also
subject to basis risk due mainly to sampling and measurement errors. Those errors affect
the estimation of predicted and realized farm-yields. As result, a farm can receive
indemnities with no farm-yield losses or not receive indemnities with farm-yield losses.
3.5

Comparing the Performance of Farm Level and Area Level Insurance
Products
Miranda (1991) using individual farm-level yield data for 102 western Kentucky

soybean producers (period 1974-88) found that the improved coverage of systemic yield

28

risk obtained through lower deductibles and higher coverage under an area level product
would outweigh the nonsystemic yield risk protection provided by a farm level product.
Mahul (1999) explained better Miranda’s findings by emphasizing that for farm
level yield insurance, the trigger yield cannot exceed the expected yield due to the
potential for moral hazard. But this is not true for an area level insurance product since
the policyholder has no significant impact on the realized county yield. With the ‘ideal’
area yield insurance the farmer is free to set the coverage level (and thus the trigger yield)
at any level. As such, the risk reduction under an area level insurance product may be
greater than that under a farm level insurance product if the nonsystemic risk is not too
high. Moreover, the premium for an individual yield insurance is higher due to
administrative costs.
3.6

Optimal Area Based Insurance
Several authors have explored the optimal area yield insurance contract (Miranda

1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet 1994; Mahul 1999; Vercammen 2000; Bourgeon
and Chambers 2003). Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet (1994) addressed the question of
designing an optimal area yield insurance contract using yield data for a sample of 123
dryland wheat producers in Montana over the ten year period 1981–90. They examined
the effects of three area yield contracts (the area yield contract offered by RMA, a
simpler “almost ideal” area yield contract, and an “ideal” area yield contract) on farm
level net yield variability (yield net of insurance premiums and indemnities). In this
study, the “almost ideal” contract, which provided the farm only with an unrestricted
choice of trigger yield and a single protection factor level of 100 percent, reduced net
yield variability by 63 percent. With the “ideal” area yield contract, under which the
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choices of both the trigger yield and protection factor are unconstrained, the net yield
variability was reduced by 65 percent but much higher premiums were required
compared to the “almost ideal” contract. The authors recommended the “almost ideal”
contract for its simplicity. Results also suggested that farm level yield insurance contracts
provide about the same degree of net yield risk reduction (compared to the “almost ideal”
contract) at lower premium rates. As such, they suggested that farm level yield insurance
will be preferred to area level yield insurance by farmers even in the absence of
opportunities for moral hazard and adverse selection. The difference between this
conclusion and Miranda’s predication could be explained by the fact that each article
considered different periods, regions, and crops.
Following these studies, Mahul (1999) used a more general framework to define
the optimal form of an area level contract. Mahul made the following assumptions: (1) a
risk averse farmer maximizing expected utility of net yield; and (2) a linear relationship
between farm yield and area yield. Miranda (1991) had hypothesized that the optimal
protection factor for a risk averse producer would approach the beta coefficient
measuring the sensitivity of the farm yield to the area yield. Mahul (1999) confirmed this
finding and also showed that the optimal protection factor did not depend on the
policyholder’s risk aversion or the cost of the insurance premium. However, the optimal
trigger yield did depend on risk aversion and the insurance premium. In the case of
actuarially fair crop insurance, the optimal trigger yield equals the maximum possible
area yield. Comparing the “almost ideal” and “ideal” contracts proposed by Smith,
Chouinard, and Baquet, Mahul affirmed there is no difference between the two contracts
for an average farm (which has a beta equal to 1.00) but farms with beta coefficients
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different from 1.00 may display significant differences in yield risk reduction with those
two contracts.
Mahul (1999) concluded that the optimal area yield contract would have the
protection factor set equal to the beta coefficient in Miranda’s (1991) decomposition of
farm yield risk. This result requires the insurance designer to be able to observe the beta
on the insured unit. In other words, the result implies symmetric information. Following
Mahul (1999), Bourgeon and Chambers (2003) explored the optimal area yield crop
insurance contract under the assumption of asymmetric information implying that the
beta on the insured unit is unobservable. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric
information, the authors confirmed Mahul’s (1999) earlier findings that the optimal
contract occurs when the slope of the indemnity schedule (the protection factor) is set
equal to the beta on the insured unit. In case of asymmetric information and high
administrative costs, they argue that the symmetric information contract is vulnerable to
adverse selection and therefore less likely to be implementable. Since the contract
involves large administrative costs, and thus is not actuarially fair, the optimal contract
would include a premium load which is contingent on the individual’s beta. As such,
farmers with high betas will have to pay higher premiums. But since there is asymmetric
information, the area yield contract designed for farmers with lower betas will be the
most chosen by farmers with high betas, hence the adverse selection problem. Based on
the authors’ findings, the optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric
information should be incentive-compatible in terms of the producer’s expected utility
and expected surplus from participation in the program with a convex indemnity
schedule.
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Mahul and Wright (2003) investigated the design of an optimal crop revenue
insurance. Assuming a quadratic utility function and actuarially fair yield and revenue
insurance policies and hedging instruments, they found that the optimal revenue
insurance contract can be perfectly replicated. When the indemnity schedule depends on
the individual yield and price (context of complete markets), the optimal crop revenue
insurance depends only on the farmer’s gross revenue. However, in the context of
incomplete markets (based on imperfect estimators of the individual yields and/or prices,
such as area yield and/or futures market prices), the optimal indemnity schedule is
influenced by the producer’s risk preferences and the extent of basis risk between a yield
and/or price index and the individual producer’s yield and/or price. This result contrasts
with Mahul’s (1999) earlier finding that optimal area yield insurance contracts were not
conditioned by producer’s risk preferences.
3.7

Empirical Studies of Area Level Insurance Performance
Barnett et al. (2005) and Deng, Barnett and Vedenov (2007) showed how binding

constraints on coverage affect the optimal value of the protection factor. Under three
premium rating schemes (actuarially fair, actual unsubsidized, and actual subsidized), the
authors suggested that the optimal protection factor is higher when constraints are
imposed on coverage. The reason for this is that restrictions on coverage stop farmers
from achieving their desired level of risk protection since indemnities are triggered less
often. Hence, if farmers are allowed to choose the protection factor, they have an
incentive to increase it so that the amount of indemnity paid will increase whenever a
payment is trigger.
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Deng et al. (2008) built on Barnett et al. (2005) to demonstrate the interdependent
adjustments required when binding constraints are imposed on coverage and protection
factor for alternative crop insurance indexes. With index insurance contracts, indemnities
are paid based on realized values of an index correlated to the farm level losses (e.g.,
county level yield) rather than the actual farm losses. Specifically, they used the area
yield index and two weather-based predicted-yields indexes. Results suggested that if
binding restrictions on coverage are imposed (by the upper bound), the optimal value for
the protection factor will be higher than if coverage is unrestricted. And if binding
restrictions are imposed on the protection factor (by the lower bound), the optimal value
for coverage will be lower than if the protection factor is unrestricted. But when both
choice variables are constrained, the policyholder’s risk preferences can affect the
constrained optimal value for coverage and protection factor. As the level of risk aversion
increases, constrained optimal coverage and protection factor can increase or remain
unchanged. Findings also revealed that area yield index contracts are preferred to
weather-based predicted yields contracts. Yet, in regions with no county yield data
available, weather-based index insurance contracts remain good alternatives. They
minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems; and provide low delivery costs
(Glauber, 2004). Deng et al. concluded that constraints on area based insurance contracts’
coverage and protection factor prevent policyholders from obtaining optimal index
insurance protection.
Wang et al. (1998) also showed that eliminating restrictions on coverage for area
yield crop insurance, which have very little economic justification, can compensate for
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the negative effects of yield basis risk at reasonable levels of correlation between farm
and area yields.
3.8

Comparing Farm and Area Yield Variability
Yield variability is generally higher at the farm level than at the area level. For

this reason, Coble and Barnett (2008) suggested that farm level risk assessment has to be
done using farm level data. Yet, the scarcity of farm level data has caused some to use
aggregated (e.g., county level) data as a proxy. Cooper et al. (2009) used farm level data
to estimate the ratio of farm to county level yield variation. They found that the ratio of
farm yield standard deviation to county yield standard deviation varies across crops and
regions. They suggested modeling farm yields as normal deviations from county
aggregate yields. Later, Claasen and Just (2011) characterized the bias in using countylevel variation as a measure of farm-level variation by separating yield variability into
systematic (spatial and temporal heterogeneity due to soil conditions) and random (due to
unanticipated factors) components. They found that aggregate county level yields
understate farm level yield variation by 50-51 percent for Northern Plains and Corn Belt
corn. From this percentage, 61-62 percent of farm level systematic variation and 42-48
percent of random variation is lost by county level aggregation in both cases.
Outside the United States, Finger (2012) investigated biases in farm yield risk
analysis due to data aggregation in Switzerland. He found that the expected yields (mean)
do not differ between different levels of aggregation but the estimated variability
decreases with increasing level of aggregation. In other words, the aggregation bias
increases with the level of aggregation. As such, yield variability at the farm level will be
higher than that at the regional level which will, in turn, be higher than that at the national
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level. As result, when aggregate data are used to estimate farm level crop yield
variability, the estimated yield variability (and hence, premium rates) will be massively
underestimated. He suggested that aggregation biases might be reduced in homogeneous
regions with uniform farm yield distributions.
3.9

Shallow Loss Area Level Products
Few recent studies have focused on shallow loss products. Dismukes et al. (2013)

analyze how the purchase of a shallow-loss area level insurance product would affect the
optimal coverage for underlying farm level crop insurance products. They found that area
triggered shallow loss insurance designs have some potential for causing producers to
reduce coverage levels for underlying farm level crop insurance. This change in coverage
affects government costs and insurance companies in term of liability and subsidy.
Luitel, Hudson and Knight (2015) analyzed the impact of shallow loss products
(SCO or STAX) on cotton growers risk management decisions in Texas. Since the 2014
Farm Bill allowed separation of coverage by practice, the authors examined whether
growers will increase or decrease coverage levels (for RP) per practice in 2015 compared
to their coverage level decision in 2014. Their findings suggested that cotton producers
would tend to decrease (increase) their coverage level for irrigated (dry land) cotton.
However, they found that overall, farmers are increasing coverage level in 2015 relative
to 2014.
Using a simulation approach (nonparametric distributions of yields for a
representative farmer in each U.S county), Cooper, Hungerford and O’Donoghue (2015)
examined the interactions of shallow loss products (SCO and ARC) and traditional
federal crop insurance for corn, winter wheat and soybeans. They found that with
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traditional crop insurance using basic and optional units, producers will reduce their
coverage level and purchase an SCO policy. This is a tradeoff between less efficient risk
protection (if farm is not well correlated to county yields) and benefit for a higher subsidy
for SCO.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Standard neoclassical economic theory is based on assumptions that individuals
are rational decision makers, utility maximizers and have perfect information. Yet, the
assumption of perfect information contradicts the notion of uncertainty and risk. In
contrast, the expected utility approach considers a fully rational individual who evaluates
potential outcomes based on probabilities and values of outcomes based on his or her risk
aversion. As such, expected utility theory is more realistic in recognizing the existence of
risk and differences in individual’s risk attitudes.
4.1

Expected Utility Model
Agriculture is typically subject to wind, weather, etc. and as such requires the

need to take account of risk. Risks in agriculture matter for two main reasons. First, most
people dislike risk and will be willing to forgo some expected return for a reduction in
risk. Second, yields depend on a large number of random variables such as rainfall and
temperature. Large deviations of these variables in either direction from their expected
values will affect yield outcomes. Risk represents any situation where some events are
not know with certainty. This representation of the term 'risk' induces the need to clarify
the two terms 'risk' and 'uncertainty'. Chavas (2004) defines a risky event "as any event
that is not known for sure ahead of time". Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997) suggest
that risk is imperfect knowledge where the probabilities of the possible outcomes are
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known, and uncertainty is when these probabilities are not known. However, probabilities
are more known "subjectively" rather than "objectively". Thus, risk is understood as
uncertain (unfavorable) consequences and uncertainty as imperfect knowledge. But in
this work, the two terms are used interchangeably.
John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern (1947) developed the expected utility
model that forms the basis of modern utility theory used to represent decision-making
under uncertainty. Expected Utility Theory (EUT) states that the decision maker chooses
between risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, i.e., the
weighted sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their
respective probabilities. The decision maker has risk preferences represented by a utility
function and he/she makes decisions in order to maximize his/her expected utility. The
utility function can be defined over gains and losses of wealth (or income).
A gamble (or game) is a formal description of a strategic situation involving
logical structures for risk management that impose some structures on what is not known.
Games induced the development of probability theory and the formal study of decisionmaking with several players. A game with only one player is called a decision problem.
Consider a gamble with a utility function 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚) defined over wealth outcome 𝑚𝑚. If 𝑚𝑚1 and

𝑚𝑚2 are the two possible ending wealth outcomes of the gamble such that the probability of
obtaining 𝑚𝑚1 is 𝜃𝜃 while (1 − 𝜃𝜃) is the probability of obtaining 𝑚𝑚2 . The expected value of
the gamble is 𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚) = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚1 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑚𝑚2 and the utility of the expected value

is 𝑈𝑈[𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚)] = 𝑈𝑈[𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚1 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑚𝑚2 ]. The expected utility of the gamble is 𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈) =

𝜃𝜃𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚1 ) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚2 ) (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012). In a world of uncertainty and

risk, the expected utility of the gamble is the most important feature for the decision
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maker. Bernoulli (1738) proposed that the appropriate decision criterion is expected
utility maximization, where the utility of an uncertain prospect is its expected utility.
The expected utility of a gamble is also equal to the utility of the certainty
equivalent (CE) from this gamble. A certainty equivalent (CE) is a guaranteed return that
someone would accept, rather than taking a chance on a higher, but uncertain, return
(Nicholson and Snyder, 2012). So, for any two alternatives 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐼𝐼, if 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 ≻ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 a risk
averse decision maker maximizing his utility will prefer alternative 𝐿𝐿 to 𝐼𝐼.

To construct a utility function over gambles, assumptions are made on people's

preferences in order to find conditions under which human behavior will always be
consistent with the expected utility theory or hypothesis. These assumptions are as
followed (Chavas, 2004):
•

Assumption A1 (Completeness or ordering): For any two uncertain prospects 𝑚𝑚1

and 𝑚𝑚2 , either 𝑚𝑚1 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚2 or 𝑚𝑚2 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚1 or individuals are

indifferent between 𝑚𝑚1 and 𝑚𝑚2 . This means that people have preferences over

outcomes, and can rank them all.
•

•

Assumption A2 (Transitivity): For any three uncertain prospects 𝑚𝑚1 , 𝑚𝑚2 and 𝑚𝑚3 , if
𝑚𝑚1 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚2 and 𝑚𝑚2 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚3 , then 𝑚𝑚1 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚3 .

Assumption A3 (Continuity): This assumption states that there exists some
probability such that the decision-maker is indifferent between the "best" and the
"worst" outcome. This implies that if faced with a risky prospect involving a good
and bad outcome, a person will take the risk if the chance of getting the bad
outcome is low enough.
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•

Assumption A4 (Monotonicity): This axiom means that a gamble which assigns a
higher probability to a preferred outcome will be preferred to one which assigns a
lower probability to a preferred outcome, as long as the other outcomes in the
gambles remain unchanged.

•

Assumption A5 (Substitution): If a decision-maker is indifferent between two
possible outcomes, then he/she will be indifferent between two gambles which
offer them with equal probabilities. If 𝑚𝑚1 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚2 , then a gamble giving
𝑚𝑚1 with probability 𝐴𝐴, and 𝑚𝑚3 with probability (1 − 𝐴𝐴), is preferred to a gamble
giving 𝑚𝑚2 with probability 𝐴𝐴, and 𝑚𝑚3 with probability (1 − 𝐴𝐴).

Based on the expected utility theorem, under assumptions A1 – A5, for any two
uncertain prospects 𝑚𝑚1 and 𝑚𝑚2 , there exists a utility function 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚) representing individual
risk preferences such that 𝑚𝑚1 ≽ 𝑚𝑚2 if and only if 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚1 ) > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚2 ) where 𝑚𝑚1 ≽ 𝑚𝑚2

signifies that 𝑚𝑚1 is preferred to 𝑚𝑚2 . Assuming all these axioms are respected, the expected
utility hypothesis provides an accurate characterization of behavior under risk.
4.2

Risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk loving
A risk averse decision maker has a utility function that exhibits diminishing

marginal utility of wealth (utility is a concave function of wealth). A risk averse
individual will refuse to play fair games (games where the individual can gain or lose
wealth but which have an expected value of zero). When faced with two investments with
a similar expected return (but different levels of risk), a risk averse individual will prefer
the one with the lower risk. When faced with a risky situation, risk averse individuals are
willing to pay an amount up to the risk premium to avoid being exposed to the risk. The
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risk premium is defined as the expected ending wealth from the risky situation minus the
certainty equivalent. This is why risk averse individuals are willing to purchase
insurance. The greater the concavity of the utility function over wealth, the more risk
averse is the individual and the greater the individual’s willingness to pay a premium to
avoid the risky situation.
A person who is indifferent between two choices with equal expected returns,
even if one choice is riskier that the other is risk neutral. A risk neutral individual has a
linear utility function over wealth. This person’s expected wealth 𝐸𝐸(𝑊𝑊) is equal to the

certainty equivalent (CE) for the risky situation so the risk premium is null. This person
would not be willing to purchase insurance.
A decision maker who wants to take on more risk even if the expected return is no
higher is said to be risk loving. A risk loving individual has a utility function that is
convex over wealth with increasing marginal utility of wealth. In this case, the risk
premium is negative and the individual would be unwilling to purchase insurance.
4.3

Risk aversion and wealth
The most commonly used measure of risk aversion was initially developed by J.

W. Pratt (1964). Assuming a utility function 𝑈𝑈(𝑊𝑊) defined over wealth (𝑊𝑊), the risk
aversion measure, 𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊) is defined as:

𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊)

𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊) = − 𝑈𝑈 ′ (𝑊𝑊)

(4.1)

where 𝑈𝑈 ′ (𝑊𝑊) is the first derivative of the utility function over wealth (assumed to always
be positive) and 𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊) is the second derivative. When the risk aversion measure is

positive {𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊) < 0}, it characterizes a risk averse person and the utility function is
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concave. A negative value for r (W ) implies that 𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊) > 0 or increasing marginal
utility and convexity of the utility function. This would be the case for a risk loving
person. A risk neutral individual has a null risk aversion measure.
This measure of risk aversion is known as absolute risk aversion. Depending on
the utility function, as wealth (W ) increases, a decision maker’s risk aversion measured
by r (W ) can stay the same (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion), increase (Increasing
Absolute Risk Aversion) or decrease (Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion). This measure
assumes that individuals think about risky gambles in terms of the absolute dollar
amounts of potential gains or losses.
Alternatively, one might assume that individuals think about potential gains or
losses from risky gambles in relation to their initial wealth. Assume a fair game where a
person has a 50% chance of winning $1,000 dollars and a 50% chance of losing $1,000
dollars. Absolute risk aversion measures assume that the level of initial wealth is
irrelevant in how decision makers would perceive this gamble. Relative risk aversion
measures recognize that a $1,000 gamble is likely to be perceived differently by someone
with low initial wealth compared to someone with high initial wealth. In other words, the
absolute risk aversion refers to the number of dollars gained from the risky game while
the relative risk aversion is about the fraction of wealth held in the risky game. Relative
risk aversion is denoted rr(W ) and calculated as following:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊) = −𝑊𝑊

𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊)
𝑈𝑈 ′ (𝑊𝑊)

= 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊)

(4.2)

As with absolute risk aversion, there is constant, increasing and decreasing relative risk
aversion. Those two risk aversion measures can give different results for the same utility
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function. For instance, the following power utility function U (W ) exhibits diminishing
absolute risk aversion (DARA) but constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
𝑈𝑈(𝑊𝑊) = �

𝑊𝑊 1−∅
1−∅

𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ∅ ≠ 1

(4.3)

𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇

The risk aversion is calculated as followed:
𝑈𝑈 ′′ (𝑊𝑊)

𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊) = − 𝑈𝑈 ′ (𝑊𝑊) = −

As W increases, r (W ) decreases.

(∅−1)𝑊𝑊 ∅−2
𝑊𝑊 ∅−1

=

1−∅
𝑊𝑊

(4.4)

The relative risk aversion is given by:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑊𝑊) = 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒) = 𝑊𝑊

1−∅
𝑊𝑊

= 1 − ∅ = 𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃 𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏 𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿.

(4.5)

For this utility function, the initial wealth does not matter for the relative risk aversion.
As wealth increases, rr(W) remains the same.
4.1 Implication for this study
Following Miranda (1991) and Mahul (1999), the relationship between area yield
and farm yield for a farmer i is assumed to be linear. The farm yield variability is
estimated showing the relation between systemic and idiosyncratic risk as followed:

with
and

𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 =

𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ) = 0

(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)

where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the random yield for farmer 𝐿𝐿 in year 𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the area yield (average yield

across all farms) in year 𝐿𝐿. The mean of 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and the mean of 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is 𝜇𝜇. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 measures the
sensitivity of the farmer’s individual yield to the systemic factor that affect the area yield.
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Equation 4.6 decomposes farm yield variation into a systemic component 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇) that

is perfectly correlated with the area yield and a nonsystemic or idiosyncratic component
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 that is uncorrelated with the area yield.

Following Dismukes et al. (2013), a risk averse expected utility maximizing

producer for farm i is assumed to have a power utility function which, as described
above, implies constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The expected utility for this utility
function is represented mathematically as:
𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈) = �

∑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡=1 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−∅

𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 ∅ ≠ 1

1−∅
∑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡=1 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )

(4.9)

𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇

where ∅ > 1 is a risk aversion coefficient and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the probability weight associated
with each of the 𝐿𝐿 possible outcomes for 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . The certainty equivalent for this utility
function is:

1

1−∅
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = �[(1 − ∅)𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 )] 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 ∅ ≠ 1
𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 )
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇

(4.10)

If 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖0 represents initial wealth, then 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖0 + 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the ending wealth where 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

is a stochastic annual net return. For any given crop produced on farm 𝐿𝐿 in year t, returns
per acre net of insurance purchasing are calculated as:

𝑃𝑃𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡�
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ��

(4.11)

where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the random yield for farmer 𝐿𝐿 in year 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the random price for farmer
𝐿𝐿 in year 𝐿𝐿. If the farmer purchases crop insurance 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the indemnity per acre from the
crop insurance product(s) for farmer 𝐿𝐿 in year 𝐿𝐿, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the premium per acre on the crop

insurance product(s) for farmer 𝐿𝐿 in year 𝐿𝐿, and 𝑃𝑃��𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� is the production cost per acre which is

assumed fixed across crop insurance purchasing decisions.
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If the insurance is actuarially fair, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) and insurance purchasing does not

impact the expected net return. Furthermore, if the insurance is actuarially-fair, 𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )

is the same across all insurance scenarios but 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇(𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ), and hence 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , are affected by

the efficacy of the insurance. The extent to which area-level products reduce 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇(𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )
is likely to depend on the beta in equation 4.6 which, in turn, is a function of the
covariance between farm yields and area yields.
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CHAPTER V
DATA AND METHODS
5.1

Data
The farm-level yield data used in this study were obtained from the U.S

Department of Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA). The data are 10year yield histories from 1999 to 2008 that were used to establish APH yields for 2009
purchasers of farm-level yield and revenue insurance policies. Price data were taken from
futures markets for the same years as the yield data.
The analysis focused on farms in Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana for irrigated
and non-irrigated cotton production. In 2015 these states accounted for more than 62
percent of U.S. planted cotton acreage. Texas alone accounted for more than 57 percent
of U.S. planted acreage. All farms with less than the full ten years of actual yield data
were deleted. Counties with less than 25 (for Texas) and 15 (for Mississippi and
Louisiana) farms which met the requirement of having a full ten years of actual yield data
were deleted. Fewer farms were required for Mississippi and Louisiana counties because
these states have significantly fewer cotton farms than Texas. In each county, farms were
segregated by irrigation practice. The number of observations per county in each state per
irrigation practice are presented in tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. Also, counties
location in each state per irrigation practice are displayed in Appendix B (figures B.1B.6).
46

For each of the 10 years for which yield data are available, futures market data
were used to calculate the percentage change %∆𝑡𝑡 between the RMA cotton projected

price and the harvest price.
5.2

Empirical model
Four different scenarios were analyzed to assess the farm-level welfare impacts of

STAX. A no insurance scenario was created as a baseline. The second scenario assumed
that farmers purchased only an RP policy. The third scenario assumed that farmers
purchased only a STAX policy while the fourth scenario assumed that both RP and
STAX were purchased. In addition results were generated for treatments with different
combinations of assumed RP coverage level, level of CRRA risk aversion, and premium
structures (actuarially fair or subsidized).
The producer for farm 𝐿𝐿 is assumed to be risk averse and an expected utility

maximizer according to a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over ending
wealth 𝑊𝑊, which is strictly increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable.
The ending wealth is a function of net revenue 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 which depends on the insurance

premium paid and the indemnity received by the producer. For the second and third
scenarios, certainty equivalent gains are derived by calculating the certainty equivalent
associated with a particular scenario and comparing it to the certainty equivalent of the no
insurance baseline. For the fourth scenario, certainty equivalent gains are relative to the
second (RP only) scenario.
The synthesis of the different treatments used is presented in table 5.1. The
maximum guarantee which has an area loss trigger of 90 percent of the county revenue is
used for all STAX scenarios and treatments.
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Table 5.1

Synthesis of the different treatments

Criteria
RP Coverage
Premium
CRRA

Initial
treatment
70%
Actuarially-fair
2

80% RP
treatment
80%
Actuarially-fair
2

CRRA=3
treatment
70%
Actuarially-fair
3

Subsidy
treatment
70%
Subsidized
2

Given the short time series of available data, farm yields are not trend adjusted.
Recall that the county yield for an irrigation practice in any given year is constructed as a
weighted average of the yields on farms in that county using that irrigation practice in
that year. Thus, not trend-adjusting the yields does not affect the correlation between
farm and county yields which is critical to assessing STAX performance.
For simplicity, for each farm 𝐿𝐿 and irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘, the acreage 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was fixed

as the average over the 10 years. This assumption allowed for the calculation of the
expected farm yield 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 :

𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

∑10
𝑖𝑖=1 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(5.1)

10

where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the yield on farm 𝐿𝐿 using irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘 in year 𝐿𝐿.

The acreage-weighted average county yield 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 in county 𝑃𝑃 was calculated for

each irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘 and year 𝐿𝐿

𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =

∑𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(5.2)

∑𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

where 𝐼𝐼 is the number of farms in county 𝑃𝑃. The simple 10-year average of the county
yield estimates were used as the estimate of the expected county yield 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =
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∑10
𝑖𝑖=1 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
10

.

(5.3)

It is important to note that STAX actually uses a 2 year ahead out-of-sample
estimate of expected county yield. Given the limited years of yield data available for this
study, the expected county yield is calculated in-sample. This implies that, all other
things equal, the findings from this study should be expected to overstate the benefits of
STAX.
For each farm 𝐿𝐿 and irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘 and for a given RP level of 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇,

the indemnity per acre is calculated as:

𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 �0, �𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 )� − (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 )� (5.4)

where the projected price 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is set at 0.6 dollars per pound and the harvest price 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × %∆𝑡𝑡 .

The actuarially fair RP premium per acre is
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) =

∑10
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
10

and the subsidized premium per acre is
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �

∑10
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
10

� × (100% − 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿%)

(5.5)

(5.6)

where 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿% is the federal premium subsidy percentage for the level of 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.

For each county 𝑃𝑃 and irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘, for a given level of RP 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and

a given STAX protection factor 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 (set at 1.20), the STAX liability and indemnity per
acre are:

𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ) × �90% − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚(70%, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)� × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 (5.7)
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖

⎛ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚��90%−�𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖×𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖)��,0�
⎞
= 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 ⎜�
,
1
�
⎟ × 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 .
90%−𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
⎝
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⎠

(5.8)

The actuarially-fair and subsidized premiums are given respectively by:
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =

10
∑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋_𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

10

∑10
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = �

10

since STAX has an 80 premium subsidy.

� × 0.20

(5.9)
(5.10)

Net revenue was calculated under different scenarios which vary with the type of
risk protection used:
Scenario 1: No insurance
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡

(5.11)

Scenario 2: Only RP insurance

𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +

𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(5.12)

Scenario 3: STAX insurance (substitute for RP)

𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +

(5.13)

𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖

Scenario 4: RP and STAX insurance (complement to RP)

𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −

𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖

(5.14)

Assuming an initial wealth per acre 𝑊𝑊0 of $500 (to prevent negative ending

wealth values), the ending wealth per acre for each scenario was calculated by summing
the net revenue and the initial wealth. Under the assumption of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), the utility function used is:
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =
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1−∅
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

1−∅

(5.15)

where ∅ > 1 is the risk aversion coefficient (set initially at ∅ = 2). For each insurance

scenario and treatment, the expected utility and the certainty equivalent calculated over the
10 ending wealth streams for farm 𝐿𝐿 and irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘 are given by:
𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) =

1− ∅

𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑10
𝑖𝑖=1

(5.16)

1− ∅

10

1

𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [(1 − ∅)𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )]1− ∅

(5.17)

Certainty equivalent gains were calculated between scenarios 1 and 2 (%∆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ); 1
and 3 (%∆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ); and finally 2 and 4 (%∆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ).

For the STAX scenarios, an attempt was made to analyze the extent to which

STAX performance was a function of the correlation between farm yield and county
yield. For each county 𝑃𝑃 and irrigation practice 𝑘𝑘, the farms were sorted in ascending

order by certainty equivalent gains attributable to STAX purchasing. For Texas, farms
below the 10th percentile and above the 90th percentile were recorded while for
Mississippi and Louisiana (which had far fewer farms) farms below the 30th percentile
and above the 70th percentile were recorded. For each of the farms in the extreme
percentiles, the correlation between farm yield and county yield was calculated. An
average of these correlations was then generated for each extreme percentile group.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
For each state and irrigation practice, results are presented for four treatments: 1)
the initial treatment; 2) CRRA = 3 treatment; 3) 80% RP coverage treatment; and 4) the
subsidy treatment.
6.1

Initial treatment
The initial treatment sets the RP coverage at 70 percent, the CRRA level at 2 and

assumes an actuarially-fair premium. Table 6.1 presents the average change in certainty
equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX, and Revenue Protection layered with STAX
for non-irrigated cotton in Texas. These findings are based on the 10-year yield histories
for 11,340 farms. In the first row, the table displays in columns 2, 4 and 6 the average
certainty equivalent gains for the initial treatment respectively for moving from no
insurance to RP (av. Δ CE_RP), from no insurance to STAX (av. Δ CE_STAX), and
from RP to RP layered with STAX (av. Δ CE_RP_STAX). For this and all subsequent
tables, the numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. On average, moving from no
insurance to the 70 percent RP increases the certainty equivalent by 2.0 percent in the
initial treatment. The average increase in the certainty equivalent in moving from no
insurance to the purchase of STAX is 1.0 percent (recall that STAX can be purchased
without an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy). When STAX is purchased as
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complement to RP, the average increase in certainty equivalent is 0.6 percent relative to
just purchasing RP.
To assess the heterogeneity of these findings across farms, the results were sorted
by the change in RP and STAX certainty equivalents. Results are presented in the
remaining rows of table 6.1 for the lowest and highest 10th percentile. More specifically,
the 2nd row presents results for the lowest 10th percentile of the farms when sorted by the
change in certainty equivalent when moving from no insurance to the 70 percent RP
insurance. The 3rd row presents results for the highest 10th percentile. For the lowest 10th
percentile 70 percent RP increased the certainty equivalent relative to no insurance by
only 0.6 percent on average (compared to a 2.0 percent increase across all non-irrigated
Texas cotton farms in the data set). Interestingly, these same farms also have lower than
average certainty equivalent gains from purchasing STAX as a substitute for RP (0.5
percent compared to 1.0 percent) or as a complement to RP (0.3 percent compared to 0.6
percent). The 3rd row presents results for the farms in the highest 10th percentile when
sorted by the certainty equivalent change from purchasing RP. For these farms, the
average increase in certainty equivalent from purchasing RP was 4.5 percent, more than
double the average across all non-irrigated Texas cotton farms. These farms also have
higher average certainty equivalent gains from purchasing STAX as a substitute for RP
(2.1 percent compared to 1 percent) and from purchasing STAX as a complement to RP
(0.9 percent compared to 0.6 percent).
The 4th and 5th rows present results from the lowest and highest 10th percentile
respectively, when the results are sorted by the certainty equivalent change when moving
from no insurance to STAX. For the lowest 10th percentile STAX purchasing increases
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average certainty equivalents by only 0.3 percent (compared to 1.0 percent for all nonirrigated Texas cotton farms). For these farms, using STAX as a complement to RP
increases average certainty equivalents by only 0.2 percent (compared to 0.6 percent).
Interestingly, for these farms RP purchasing also increases certainty equivalents less than
for all non-irrigated Texas cotton farms (1.0 percent compared to 2.0 percent). For the
highest 10th percentile, STAX increases average certainty equivalents relative to the no
insurance case by 2.2 percent (compared to 1.0 percent for all non-irrigated Texas cotton
farms). Similarly, when used as a complement to RP, STAX increased average certainty
equivalents by 0.9 percent compared to 0.6 percent across all non-irrigated Texas cotton
farms. For these farms, RP purchasing also increased average certainty equivalents more
than the average across all non-irrigated Texas cotton farms (4.1 percent compared to 2.0
percent). For each result, the two-tailed test at 5 percent significance was performed to
see whether the results are statistically different from zero. All the results are statistically
different from zero at the level of 5 percent. Figure B.7 in Appendix B presents an
example of the heterogeneity of farm-level results.
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the results for the initial treatment for non-irrigated
cotton in Mississippi and Louisiana. The first thing to note about these tables is that data
were available from far fewer farms than for Texas – only 170 farms in Mississippi and
258 in Louisiana. The average certainty equivalent gains in Mississippi are 0.9, 1.0, and
0.8 percent for moving from no insurance to RP, no insurance to STAX, and RP to RP
layered with STAX. The comparable average certainty equivalent gains in Louisiana are
3.4, 2.1, and 0.9 percent, respectively. For Texas and Louisiana, average certainty
equivalent gains are higher for RP than for STAX but for Mississippi the average
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certainty equivalent gain for STAX is slightly higher than for RP. Due to the fewer
number of farms in Mississippi and Louisiana, the heterogeneity of results was assessed
using the lowest and highest 30th percentile (rather than the lowest and highest 10th
percentile as in Texas). Similar to the results in Texas, the results for both Mississippi
and Louisiana reflect considerable heterogeneity in the performance of both RP and
STAX across farms.
Results for irrigated cotton in Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana are presented in
tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 for the initial treatment. Again, data were available for many more
farms in Texas (6,981) than in Mississippi (40) and Louisiana (20). In Texas, average RP
certainty equivalent gains for irrigated cotton are considerably higher compared to the
same values for non-irrigated cotton (3.5 percent compared to 2.0 percent). In Mississippi
the average RP certainty equivalent gain is about the same for irrigated and non-irrigated
cotton production (1.0 percent compared to 0.9 percent). In Louisiana, the average RP
certainty equivalent gain for irrigated cotton is considerably lower than that for nonirrigated cotton (1.3 percent compared to 3.4 percent).
For irrigated cotton production in Texas, the purchase of STAX as a substitute for
RP increases the average certainty equivalent by the same amount as for non-irrigated
cotton production (1.0 percent). In Louisiana, the purchase of STAX as a substitute for
RP increases the average certainty equivalent for irrigated production less than for nonirrigated production (1.4 percent compared to 2.1 percent). In Mississippi, the purchase of
STAX as a substitute for RP increases the average certainty equivalent for irrigated
production more than for non-irrigated production (1.2 percent compared to 1.0 percent).
In all three states, STAX purchased as a complement to RP increases average certainty
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equivalents for irrigated production less than for non-irrigated production. In general,
these findings suggest that irrigated cotton producers are less likely (than non-irrigated
cotton producers) to purchase STAX either as a complement to, or substitute for, RP.
In general, there appears to be more heterogeneity in the results across farms for
irrigated cotton production than for non-irrigated production. This is particularly true for
Texas. When Texas results are sorted by RP certainty equivalent gain, the average
certainty equivalent gain for the top 10th percentile is 8.2 percent compared to only 0.8
percent for the bottom 10th percentile. When Texas results are sorted by STAX certainty
equivalent gain (relative to the no insurance scenario), the average certainty equivalent
gain for the top 10th percentile is 2.6 percent compared to -0.5 percent for the bottom 10th
percentile. Thus, the results suggest that purchasing actuarially-fair STAX insurance
would actually make some irrigated cotton farmers in the state worse off. When
purchased as a complement to RP, STAX increases the certainty equivalent of the lowest
10th percentile by only 0.1 percent.
6.2

CRRA=3 treatment
As a test on the robustness of the findings from the initial treatment, a second

treatment increased the CRRA level from 2 to 3. A CRRA level of 2 implies moderate
risk aversion whereas a level of 3 implies a more risk averse decision maker.
Results for the higher level of risk aversion are shown in columns 3, 5, and 7 of
tables 6.1 – 6.6. Overall, marginal certainty equivalent gains when assuming the higher
level of risk aversion (CRRA=3) are greater than or equal to those when assuming a
moderate level of risk aversion (CRRA=2). The only exception is for irrigated production
in Texas where, for the lowest 10th percentile ranked by STAX performance, the higher
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level of risk aversion actually generates a greater reduction in certainty equivalent (-1.0
percent compared to -0.5 percent for CRRA=2).
In table 6.6, when Louisiana results are sorted by STAX certainty equivalent gain
(relative to the no insurance scenario), the average certainty equivalent gain for the top
30th percentile (0.9 percent) is not statistically different from zero (NS in superscript).
This suggest that the farmers in this group have no certainty equivalent gains. All the
remaining results are statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
6.3

80% RP treatment
This treatment increases the RP coverage level to 80 percent and returns to an

assumed risk aversion level of 2.0 (to facilitate comparison to the initial treatment). This
change in RP coverage level will affect results for the RP scenario and the STAX as a
complement to RP scenario. It will not affect results for the STAX as a substitute for RP
scenario.
Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 compare the initial treatment with 70 percent RP coverage
to the 80 percent RP coverage treatment for non-irrigated cotton producers in Texas,
Mississippi and Louisiana. Not surprisingly, increasing the RP coverage level increases
the certainty equivalent gains from purchasing RP relative to a no insurance case.
However, when STAX is purchased as a complement to RP, increasing the RP coverage
level reduces the layer of coverage provided by STAX. So the average certainty
equivalent gains from STAX (relative to just purchasing RP) are lower when the RP
coverage level is higher. This finding also holds true for irrigated cotton in the three
states (see tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12 for Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana irrigated
cotton). Another impact of increasing the RP coverage level is that there is less
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heterogeneity across farms in a state in certainty equivalent gains from using STAX as a
complement to RP. The results are all statistically different from zero at the level of 5
percent.
6.4

Subsidy treatment
In all the previous treatments the premium was calculated to be actuarially-fair in

sample. Imposing actuarially-fair premiums allows one to focus on certainty equivalent
gains due strictly to risk reduction. However, in reality, premiums are subsidized at 80
percent for STAX and 59 percent for 70 percent RP coverage. This treatment generates
certainty equivalent gains by applying the actual STAX and RP premium subsidy
percentages to the in sample actuarially-fair premiums. To facilitate comparison to the
initial treatment, the RP coverage level is returned to 70 percent and the CRRA level is
returned to 2.0.
Results for non-irrigated production in Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana are
presented in tables 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15, respectively. Results for irrigated production are
presented in tables 6.16, 6.17, and 6.18. Regardless of the irrigation practice, the
subsidized treatment greatly increases the certainty equivalent gains. For non-irrigated
production in Texas, the subsidy increases the RP average certainty equivalent gain from
2.0 percent to 5.4 percent. For STAX as a substitute for RP, the subsidy increases the
average certainty equivalent gain from 1.0 percent to 5.0 percent. For STAX as a
complement to RP, the subsidy increases the average certainty equivalent gain from 0.6
percent to 4.2 percent. As in the earlier tables, results are also shown for the extreme
percentiles. These findings suggest that, with the subsidies taken into account, nonirrigated Texas cotton farmers would be better off taking both RP and STAX. If, for some
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reason, farmers were determined to use only one insurance product, in some cases
subsidized STAX would be preferred over subsidized RP. This reflects the higher subsidy
percentage for STAX relative to RP. Similar results occur for the other states and
irrigation practices except for non-irrigated production in Louisiana and irrigated
production in Texas where if forced to choose between subsidized RP and subsidized
STAX, farmers would generally, though not always, prefer RP. The results are all
statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
Further analysis was performed to see if farmers are better of reducing the RP
coverage level and layering it with STAX. Certainty equivalent gains for subsidized 80
percent RP were calculated. For each farm the CE gain for subsidized 80 percent RP was
subtracted from the CE gain for subsidized 70 percent RP layered with subsidized STAX.
The difference was positive for all farmers in every state and for both irrigation practices.
Table 6.19 presents the average of these differences by state and irrigation practice. Under
subsidized premiums, RP coverage at 70 percent layered with STAX increases CE gains
by 4.9 percent (4.6 percent) on average for non-irrigated (irrigated) cotton in Texas relative
to 80 percent RP. Similar findings occur for the other states and all results are statistically
different from zero at the 5 percent level of significance. These results are consistent with
those of Luitel, Hudson and Knight (2015) and Cooper, Hungerford and O’Donoghue
(2015).
6.5

Summary of empirical findings
Assuming actuarially-fair premiums, the marginal certainty equivalent gains for

RP tend to be higher than for STAX alone but this is frequently not the case when
premiums are subsidized. When STAX is purchased as a complement to RP the marginal
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certainty equivalent gains tend to be small when premiums are actuarially-fair. Since
most cotton growers currently purchase RP, this finding may explain in part why STAX
participation was low in 2015. However, the analysis presented here also showed that
when premiums are subsidized, the certainty equivalent gains from adding STAX to RP
can be significant. This suggests that, even if STAX does not offer much additional risk
reduction when used as a complement to RP, most farmers should purchase STAX just to
capture the benefit of the subsidy. Moreover, compared to 80 percent RP, farmers are
better off reducing RP overage and layering with STAX.
Increasing RP coverage from 70 percent to 80 percent increases certainty
equivalents for RP but reduces certainty equivalents for STAX as a complement to RP.
This is due to the reduction of the deductible layer covered by STAX. A higher level of
risk aversion increases certainty equivalent gains from insurance purchasing except for
rare cases when STAX purchasing actually generates reductions in certainty equivalents.
In this analysis this is seen in the average certainty equivalent change for the lowest 10th
percentile (when sorted by the certainty equivalent change when moving from no
insurance to STAX) for irrigated cotton production in Texas.
Finally, these results clearly show the limitations of insurance analyses based on a
single representative farm for a county or state. In this study based on many farms,
significant heterogeneity was observed in the certainty equivalent gains generated by RP
and by STAX either as a substitute for, or complement to, RP. This is an important
finding which explains why some farmers may be less interested in RP or STAX even
when these products on average increase certainty equivalents.
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6.6

Explanation of the variation of STAX performance
To better understand STAX performance, further analysis was conducted on the

extreme percentiles (top and bottom 10th percentile for Texas, top and bottom 30th
percentile for Mississippi and Louisiana) when farms were ranked according to the
certainty equivalent gains from purchasing STAX (as a substitute for RP). Specifically,
for farms in each of the extreme percentiles, the correlation of farm yield to county yield
was calculated and then the average of these correlations was calculated across all the
farms in the extreme percentile.
Tables 6.20, 6.21 and 6.22 present farm yield to county yield correlation results
for non-irrigated cotton respectively in Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. For Texas,
farm yield to county yield correlations are negative for all treatments other than the
subsidy treatment. While the correlations are generally lower for the bottom 10th
percentile than for the top 10th percentile, the fact that they are so low even for the top
10th percentile suggests that STAX would have provided very little risk protection for
non-irrigated Texas cotton farmers over the 10 years being analyzed. This is consistent
with the findings in table 6.1. For non-irrigated cotton production in Mississippi, farm
yields are on average uncorrelated with county yields for farms in the bottom 30th
percentile for all treatments except for the subsidy treatment. For the top 30th percentile
the average farm yield to county yield correlation ranges from 0.133 to 0.198. Again, the
differences between the top and bottom 30th percentiles are smaller for the subsidy
treatment. The findings for non-irrigated cotton production in Louisiana are similar to
those from Mississippi. For the bottom 30th percentile, the average correlation between
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farm yield and county yield from 0.025 to 0.054. For the top 30th percentile, the average
correlation ranges from 0.131 to 0.163.
Table 6.23 shows correlation results for irrigated Cotton in Texas. In the initial
treatment, the average farm yield to county yield correlation for farmers in the lowest 10th
percentile was 0.084. For the highest 10th percentile the correlation was 0.220. The results
are similar for the 80 percent RP coverage treatment and the CRRA=3 treatment. In the
subsidy treatment, the gap between the two groups is much smaller (0.143 compared to
0.173). This shows that with an 80 percent premium subsidy, it isn’t just the farm yield to
county yield correlation that determines the relative benefits of STAX across farms.
Farms in riskier counties have higher STAX premiums and thus capture more wealth
transfers in the form of STAX premium subsidies (the premium subsidy is 80 percent of
the in sample actuarially-fair premium).
Table 6.24 presents correlation results for irrigated cotton in Mississippi. Here the
difference between the bottom 30th percentile and the top 30th percentile in average farm
yield to county yield correlation is much more apparent. For the top 30th percentile the
average farm yield to county yield correlation ranges from 0.471 to 0.703. For the bottom
30th percentile, the average farm yield to county yield correlation is actually negative for
the initial treatment and the 80 percent RP coverage treatment. As with Texas, the
difference in average farm yield to county yield correlation between the bottom and top
30th percentiles is much smaller once subsidies are introduced.
Table 6.25 presents correlation results for irrigated cotton in Louisiana. Average
farm yield to county yield correlation ranges from 0.237 to 0.298 for the bottom 30th
percentile and from 0.312 to 0.395 for the top 30th percentile.
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A synthesis of certainty equivalent gains for all the treatments for each state and
irrigation practice are presented in Appendix A (Tables A-3 and A-4).
Table 6.1

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Non- Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

11340
10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.008 for r=2.0
≤0.012 for r=3.0
10th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.034 for r=2.0
≥0.053 for r=3.0
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.005 for r=2.0
≤0.007 for r=3.0
10th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.017 for r=2.0
≥0.026 for r=3.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

r = 2.0
0.020
(0.011)

r = 3.0
0.030
(0.018)

r = 2.0
0.010
(0.006)

r = 3.0
0.015
(0.009)

0.006
(0.002)

0.008
(0.003)

0.005
(0.003)

0.045
(0.010)

0.073
(0.017)

0.010
(0.006)
0.041
(0.012)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.006
(0.003)

r = 3.0
0.008
(0.004)

0.007
(0.004)

0.003
(0.002)

0.004
(0.003)

0.021
(0.006)

0.034
(0.012)

0.009
(0.002)

0.013
(0.003)

0.016
(0.010)

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.004)

0.002
(0.002)

0.003
(0.003)

0.068
(0.020)

0.022
(0.004)

0.036
(0.008)

0.009
(0.002)

0.013
(0.003)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.2

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Non- Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

170
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.004 for r=2.0
≤0.007 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.009 for r=2.0
≥0.014 for r=3.0
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.009 for r=2.0
≤0.014 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.012 for r=2.0
≥0.018 for r=3.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

r = 2.0
0.009
(0.009)

r = 3.0
0.013
(0.014)

0.003
(0.001)

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆
CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.010
(0.005)

r = 3.0
0.015
(0.008)

r = 2.0
0.008
(0.003)

r = 3.0
0.011
(0.004)

0.005
(0.001)

0.009
(0.002)

0.013
(0.005)

0.007
(0.002)

0.010
(0.004)

0.017
(0.011)

0.027
(0.019)

0.012
(0.008)

0.017
(0.013)

0.008
(0.003)

0.012
(0.005)

0.009
(0.012)

0.013
(0.018)

0.005
(0.006)

0.008
(0.010)

0.005
(0.003)

0.007
(0.005)

0.012
(0.009)

0.019
(0.014)

0.014
(0.003)

0.022
(0.004)

0.010
(0.002)

0.014
(0.002)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.3

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Non- Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

258
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.018 for r=2.0
≤0.028 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.049 for r=2.0
≥0.083 for r=3.0
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.016 for r=2.0
≤0.026 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.026 for r=2.0
≥0.043 for r=3.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

r = 2.0
0.034
(0.019)

r = 3.0
0.058
(0.034)

r = 2.0
0.021
(0.007)

r = 3.0
0.034
(0.014)

0.013
(0.003)

0.021
(0.005)

0.014
(0.003)

0.058
(0.007)

0.101
(0.012)

0.017
(0.013)
0.057
(0.008)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.009
(0.002)

r = 3.0
0.013
(0.003)

0.021
(0.004)

0.008
(0.002)

0.011
(0.003)

0.028
(0.006)

0.048
(0.013)

0.010
(0.002)

0.015
(0.003)

0.028
(0.021)

0.013
(0.003)

0.020
(0.006)

0.007
(0.002)

0.011
(0.003)

0.098
(0.014)

0.030
(0.003)

0.051
(0.005)

0.010
(0.002)

0.015
(0.002)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.4

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

6981
10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.011 for r=2.0
≤0.016 for r=3.0
10th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.064 for r=2.0
≥0.105 for r=3.0
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.001 for r=2.0
≤0.0005 for r=3.0
10th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.021 for r=2.0
≥0.033 for r=2.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

r = 2.0
0.035
(0.022)

r = 3.0
0.057
(0.037)

r = 2.0
0.010
(0.009)

r = 3.0
0.016
(0.014)

0.008
(0.002)

0.011
(0.003)

0.005
(0.003)

0.082
(0.017)

0.133
(0.027)

0.039
(0.022)
0.061
(0.023)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.005
(0.003)

r = 3.0
0.007
(0.005)

0.008
(0.005)

0.003
(0.002)

0.005
(0.003)

0.015
(0.013)

0.023
(0.022)

0.006
(0.004)

0.009
(0.006)

0.066
(0.036)

-0.005
(0.005)

-0.010
(0.010)

0.001
(0.003)

0.001
(0.005)

0.097
(0.036)

0.026
(0.005)

0.042
(0.008)

0.009
(0.003)

0.012
(0.005)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.5

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

40
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.006 for r=2.0
≤0.009 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.015 for r=2.0
≥0.024 for r=3.0
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.010 for r=2.0
≤0.016 for r=3.0
30th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.013 for r=2.0
≥0.021 for r=3.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

r = 2.0
0.010
(0.006)

r = 3.0
0.017
(0.010)

r = 2.0
0.012
(0.003)

r = 3.0
0.018
(0.005)

0.004
(0.001)

0.007
(0.002)

0.009
(0.002)

0.018
(0.002)

0.029
(0.003)

0.005
(0.002)
0.017
(0.003)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.007
(0.002)

r = 3.0
0.010
(0.003)

0.014
(0.003)

0.007
(0.002)

0.010
(0.003)

0.015
(0.002)

0.024
(0.003)

0.007
(0.002)

0.010
(0.003)

0.008
(0.003)

0.008
(0.002)

0.013
(0.003)

0.005
(0.001)

0.009
(0.002)

0.028
(0.005)

0.015
(0.002)

0.025
(0.003)

0.008
(0.002)

0.011
(0.002)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.6

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0 and CRRA 3.0

Farms

20
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.010 for r=2.0
≤0.015 for r=3.0

30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.014 for r=2.0
≥0.022 for r=3.0
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.012 for r=2.0
≤0.019 for r=3.0

30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.015 for r=2.0
≥0.023 for r=3.0

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

r = 2.0
0.014
(0.002)

r = 3.0
0.021
(0.004)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

r = 2.0
0.008
(0.001)

r = 3.0
0.011
(0.002)

r = 2.0
0.013
(0.005)

r = 3.0
0.020
(0.008)

0.009
(0.001)

0.013
(0.001)

0.012
(0.002)

0.018
(0.002)

0.007
(0.001)

0.010
(0.002)

0.018
(0.004)

0.029
(0.007)

0.017
(0.002)

0.026
(0.003)

0.009
(0.001)

0.013
(0.001)

0.009𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 0.014
(0.003) (0.003)

0.010
(0.001)

0.017
(0.002)

0.006
(0.001)

0.009
(0.002)

0.018
(0.004)

0.017
(0.002)

0.026
(0.003)

0.009
(0.001)

0.013
(0.001)

0.029
(0.007)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
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Table 6.7

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Non-Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
11340

10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.008 for cov=70%
≤0.010 for cov=80%
10th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.034 for cov=70%
≥0.039 for cov=80%
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.005 for cov=70%
≤0.003 for cov=80%
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.017 for cov=70%
≥0.010 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*
Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.020
0.022
(0.011)
(0.012)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70%
Cov=80%
0.006
0.003
(0.003)
(0.001)

0.006
(0.002)

0.007
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)

0.002
(0.001)

0.045
(0.010)

0.051
(0.010)

0.009
(0.002)

0.004
(0.001)

0.010
(0.006)

0.011
(0.006)

0.002
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

0.041
(0.012)

0.047
(0.013)

0.009
(0.002)

0.005
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.8

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Non-Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
170

30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.004 for cov=70%
≤0.008 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.009 for cov=70%
≥0.014 for cov=80%
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.009 for cov=70%
≤0.006 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.012 for cov=70%
≥0.008 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*
Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.009
0.013
(0.009)
(0.009)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70%
Cov=80%
0.008
0.004
(0.003)
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

0.007
(0.002)

0.004
(0.001)

0.017
(0.011)

0.023
(0.012)

0.008
(0.003)

0.005
(0.002)

0.009
(0.012)

0.012
(0.011)

0.005
(0.003)

0.003
(0.002)

0.012
(0.009)

0.019
(0.011)

0.010
(0.002)

0.006
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.9

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Non-Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
258

30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.018 for cov=70%
≤0.023 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.049 for cov=70%
≥0.054 for cov=80%
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.016 for cov=70%
≤0.009 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.026 for cov=70%
≥0.014 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*
Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.034
0.039
(0.019)
(0.020)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70%
Cov=80%
0.009
0.005
(0.002)
(0.001)

0.013
(0.003)

0.018
(0.003)

0.008
(0.002)

0.004
(0.001)

0.058
(0.007)

0.064
(0.008)

0.010
(0.002)

0.005
(0.001)

0.017
(0.013)

0.022
(0.014)

0.007
(0.002)

0.004
(0.001)

0.057
(0.008)

0.061
(0.010)

0.010
(0.002)

0.005
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.10

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
6981

10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.011 for cov=70%
≤0.015 for cov=80%
10th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.064 for cov=70%
≥0.071 for cov=80%
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.001 for cov=70%
≤0.001 for cov=80%
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.021 for cov=70%
≥0.011 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*
Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70% Cov=80% Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.035
0.040
0.005
0.003
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.003)
(0.002)
0.008
(0.002)

0.011
(0.003)

0.003
(0.002)

0.002
(0.001)

0.082
(0.017)

0.090
(0.018)

0.006
(0.004)

0.003
(0.002)

0.039
(0.022)

0.042
(0.023)

0.001
(0.003)

0.001
(0.001)

0.061
(0.023)

0.063
(0.023)

0.009
(0.003)

0.005
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.11

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
40

30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.006 for cov=70%
≤0.010 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.015 for cov=70%
≥0.019 for cov=80%
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.010 for cov=70%
≤0.016 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.013 for cov=70%
≥0.021 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*
Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70% Cov=80% Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.010
0.014
0.007
0.004
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.002)
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)

0.008
(0.001)

0.007
(0.002)

0.004
(0.001)

0.018
(0.002)

0.022
(0.002)

0.007
(0.002)

0.004
(0.002)

0.005
(0.002)

0.009
(0.003)

0.005
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

0.017
(0.003)

0.022
(0.003)

0.008
(0.002)

0.005
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.12

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, Coverage 80% and CRRA 2.0
Farms
20

30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.010 for cov=70%
≤0.014 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.014 for cov=70%
≥0.019 for cov=80%
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.012 for cov=70%
≤0.007 for cov=80%
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.015 for cov=70%
≥0.009 for cov=80%

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆
CE_RP_STAX***
Cov=70% Cov=80%
0.008
0.004
(0.001)
(0.001)

Cov=70%
0.013
(0.005)

Cov=80%
0.017
(0.005)

0.009
(0.001)

0.012
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

0.004
(0.001)

0.018
(0.004)

0.022
(0.005)

0.009
(0.001)

0.005
(0.000)

0.009𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.003)

0.013
(0.003)

0.006
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

0.018
(0.004)

0.026
(0.010)

0.009
(0.001)

0.005
(0.000)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection.
NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
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Table 6.13

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Non- Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
11340
10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.008 for AF
≤0.028 for S
10th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.034 for AF
≥0.082 for S
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.005 for AF
≤0.034 for S
10th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.017 for AF
≥0.070 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

AF
premium

S
premium

AF
premium

S
premium

0.020
(0.011)

0.54
(0.022)

0.010
(0.006)

0.006
(0.002)

0.021
(0.006)

0.045
(0.010)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.050
(0.014)

0.006
(0.003)

0.042
(0.012)

0.005
(0.003)

0.046
(0.010)

0.003
(0.002)

0.043
(0.010)

0.096
(0.014)

0.021
(0.006)

0.056
(0.015)

0.009
(0.002)

0.042
(0.013)

0.010
(0.006)

0.050
(0.017)

0.003
(0.003)

0.031
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

0.027
(0.002)

0.041
(0.012)

0.066
(0.020)

0.022
(0.004)

0.076
(0.004)

0.009
(0.002)

0.065
(0.004)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.14

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Non-Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
40
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.006 for AF
≤0.015 for S
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.015 for AF
≥0.031 for S
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.010 for AF
≤0.044 for S
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.013 for AF
≥0.058 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

AF
premium

S
premium

AF
premium

S
premium

0.010
(0.006)

0.022
(0.010)

0.012
(0.003)

0.004
(0.001)

0.011
(0.002)

0.018
(0.002)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.051
(0.002)

0.007
(0.002)

0.045
(0.011)

0.009
(0.002)

0.057
(0.003)

0.007
(0.002)

0.054
(0.003)

0.035
(0.001)

0.015
(0.002)

0.050
(0.012)

0.007
(0.002)

0.040
(0.011)

0.005
(0.002)

0.018
(0.010)

0.008
(0.002)

0.042
(0.001)

0.005
(0.001)

0.035
(0.001)

0.017
(0.003)

0.024
(0.007)

0.015
(0.002)

0.062
(0.006)

0.008
(0.002)

0.057
(0.003)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.15

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Non- Irrigated
Cotton Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
258
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.018 for AF
≤0.039 for S
30th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.049 for AF
≥0.083 for S
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.016 for AF
≤0.053 for S
30th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.026 for AF
≥0.066 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

AF
premium

S
premium

AF
premium

S
premium

0.013
(0.003)

0.031
(0.005)

0.014
(0.003)

0.058
(0.007)

0.098
(0.012)

0.017
(0.013)
0.057
(0.008)

0.034
(0.019)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.052
(0.006)

0.008
(0.002)

0.044
(0.006)

0.028
(0.006)

0.066
(0.008)

0.010
(0.002)

0.042
(0.004)

0.042
(0.020)

0.013
(0.003)

0.049
(0.004)

0.007
(0.002)

0.040
(0.004)

0.089
(0.020)

0.030
(0.003)

0.069
(0.004)

0.010
(0.002)

0.045
(0.005)

0.062
(0.028)

0.021
(0.007)

0.059
(0.009)

0.009
(0.002)

0.043
(0.005)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.16

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Texas Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
6981
10th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.011 for AF
≤0.029 for S
10th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.064 for AF
≥0.123 for S
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.001 for AF
≤0.033 for S
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.021 for AF
≥0.074 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

AF
premium

S
premium

AF
premium

S
premium

0.035
(0.022)

0.073
(0.039)

0.010
(0.009)

0.008
(0.002)

0.021
(0.006)

0.082
(0.017)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.054
(0.016)

0.005
(0.003)

0.044
(0.012)

0.005
(0.003)

0.043
(0.013)

0.003
(0.002)

0.040
(0.012)

0.152
(0.027)

0.015
(0.013)

0.064
(0.018)

0.006
(0.004)

0.045
(0.011)

0.039
(0.022)

0.053
(0.033)

-0.005
(0.005)

0.026
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)

0.023
(0.005)

0.061
(0.023)

0.107
(0.041)

0.026
(0.005)

0.082
(0.008)

0.009
(0.003)

0.059
(0.006)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.17

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Mississippi Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
40
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.006 for AF
≤0.015 for S
30th highest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≥0.015 for AF
≥0.031 for S
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.010 for AF
≤0.044 for S
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≥0.013 for AF
≥0.058 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

AF
premium

S
premium

AF
premium

S
premium

0.004
(0.001)

0.011
(0.002)

0.009
(0.002)

0.018
(0.002)

0.035
(0.001)

0.005
(0.002)
0.017
(0.003)

0.010
(0.006)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.057
(0.003)

0.007
(0.002)

0.054
(0.003)

0.015
(0.002)

0.050
(0.012)

0.007
(0.002)

0.040
(0.011)

0.018
(0.010)

0.008
(0.002)

0.042
(0.001)

0.005
(0.001)

0.035
(0.001)

0.024
(0.007)

0.015
(0.002)

0.062
(0.006)

0.008
(0.002)

0.057
(0.003)

0.022
(0.010)

0.012
(0.003)

0.051
(0.002)

0.007
(0.002)

0.045
(0.011)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table 6.18

Average change in certainty equivalents for Revenue Protection, STAX,
and Revenue Protection layered with STAX, Louisiana Irrigated Cotton
Coverage 70%, CRRA 2.0, actuarially-fair (AF) and subsidized (S)
premiums

Farms
20
30th lowest sorted by
CE_RP ranking
≤0.010 for AF
≤0.022 for S
30th highest sorted
by CE_RP ranking
≥0.014 for AF
≥0.031 for S
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
≤0.012 for AF
≤0.051 for S
30th highest sorted
by CE_STAX ranking
≥0.015 for AF
≥0.053 for S

Av. ∆ CE_RP*

AF
premium

S
premium

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**
AF
premium

S
premium

0.009
(0.001)

0.020
(0.002)

0.012
(0.002)

0.018
(0.004)

0.038
(0.007)

0.009𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.003)
0.018
(0.004)

0.013
(0.005)

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

AF
premium

S
premium

0.050
(0.002)

0.007
(0.001)

0.044
(0.001)

0.017
(0.002)

0.053
(0.001)

0.009
(0.001)

0.044
(0.001)

0.022
(0.004)

0.010
(0.001)

0.049
(0.002)

0.006
(0.001)

0.043
(0.001)

0.034
(0.008)

0.017
(0.002)

0.054
(0.001)

0.009
(0.001)

0.045
(0.001)

0.028
(0.008)

0.014
(0.002)

0.051
(0.002)

0.008
(0.001)

0.044
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection.
NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
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Table 6.19

Average of difference between subsidized 80% RP and subsidized 70% RP
layered with subsidized STAX across state and per irrigation practice.
State

Texas

Practice
Non-irrigated
Irrigated

Mississippi

Non-irrigated
Irrigated

Louisiana

Non-irrigated
Irrigated
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Average differences
0.049
(0.012)
0.046
(0.014)
0.058
(0.009)
0.048
(0.013)
0.048
(0.006)
0.047
(0.002)

Table 6.20

Average farm-county yield correlation in Texas for Non- Irrigated cotton
based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking

NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.

Table 6.21

Average correlation
-0.063
(0.304)
−0.003𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.208)
-0.070
(0.293)
−0.002𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.210)
-0.046
(0.307)
−0.011𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.211)
-0.081
(0.198)
0.055
(0.215)

Average farm-county yield correlation in Mississippi for Non- Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking

NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
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Average correlation
0.003𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.331)
0.195
(0.255)
0.021𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.324)
0.166
(0.280)
0.012𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.320)
0.198
(0.260)
0.075𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.322)
0.133
(0.274)

Table 6.22

Average farm-county yield correlation in Louisiana for Non- Irrigated
cotton based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking

NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.

Table 6.23

Average correlation
0.047𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.278)
0.131
(0.094)
0.054𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.264)
0.142
(0.098)
0.025𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.277)
0.133
(0.087)
0.049𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.246)
0.163
(0.122)

Average farm-county yield correlation in Texas for Irrigated cotton based
on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
10th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
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Average correlation
0.084
(0.312)
0.220
(0.283)
0.080
(0.319)
0.186
(0.282)
0.081
(0.311)
0.206
(0.269)
0.143
(0.325)
0.173
(0.283)

Table 6.24

Average farm-county yield correlation in Mississippi for Irrigated cotton
based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking

NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.

Table 6.25

Average correlation
−0.022𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.463)
0.494
(0.232)
−0.049𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.493)
0.471
(0.274)
0.089𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.393)
0.484
(0.240)
0.466
(0.255)
0.703
(0.208)

Average farm-county yield correlation in Louisiana for Irrigated cotton
based on STAX certainty equivalent ranking

Treatments
Initial treatment

80% RP treatment
CRRA=3 treatment

Subsidy treatment

Percentile
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th lowest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking
30th highest sorted by
CE_STAX ranking

NS: Not statistically different from zero at the level of 5 percent.
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Average correlation
0.263𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
(0.147)
0.369
(0.122)
0.298
(0.124)
0.369
(0.122)
0.263
(0.147)
0.312
(0.060)
0.237
(0.201)
0.395
(0.108)

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The 2014 farm bill increased the estimated annual cost of the Federal Crop
Insurance Program by $5.7 billion due to the introduction of two new insurance products:
the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) which is available only for cotton and the
Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) which is available for cotton and other crops. SCO
and STAX are shallow loss, area based, products that can be purchased as a complement
to an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy. STAX (but not SCO) can also be purchased
as a substitute for YP, RP, or RP-HPE.
Both STAX and SCO are subsidized. The STAX premium subsidy is 80 percent;
leaving just 20 percent of the premium to be paid by growers. However, despite the
subsidy, in 2015, only 30.7 percent of the total insured cotton acreage in the United States
were insured under STAX.
This study analyzes the farm-level performance of STAX for cotton growers in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas assuming that county yield is estimated using RMA
yield data from YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies rather than NASS county level yield data.
The specific objectives are: (1) To assess the farm-level welfare impacts (measured as
changes in the certainty equivalent) of STAX both as a substitute for RP and as a
complement to RP; (2) To determine the extent to which the farm-level welfare impacts
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of STAX are due to the premium subsidy rather than risk protection; and (3) To analyze
the heterogeneity of farm-level STAX performance among farms within a county.
Using 10 years of actual farm yield data for the period 1999 to 2008, certainty
equivalent gains were evaluated under four treatments in Texas, Mississippi and
Louisiana for non-irrigated and irrigated cotton production. The initial treatment had RP
coverage at 70 percent, the CRRA level at 2, and assumed an actuarially-fair premium.
This treatment was used as a base for comparison with the remaining treatments. In the
second treatment the CRRA level was increased to 3. In the third treatment the RP
coverage level was increased to 80 percent (with the CRRA level set again at 2). Finally,
in the fourth treatment, RP and STAX premium subsidies were introduced at their current
levels (with the RP coverage level at 70 percent and the CRRA level set at 2). For each
treatment, we observe three scenarios: moving from no insurance to RP, moving from no
insurance to STAX, and moving from RP to RP layered with STAX.
Findings show that, assuming actuarially-fair premiums, certainty equivalent
gains for RP tend to be higher than for STAX. But with subsidized premiums, the
opposite outcome sometimes occurs. Under actuarially-fair premiums, when STAX is
purchased as a complement to RP, the certainty equivalent gains from STAX are
relatively small. In other words, purchasing STAX as an add-on policy to RP generally
does not greatly improve certainty equivalents. Since most cotton farmers currently
purchase RP, this might help explain the low participation in STAX in 2015. However,
the findings indicate that once the current level of premium subsidy is introduced, most
cotton farmers will experience certainty equivalent gains from purchasing STAX,
regardless of whether or not they have purchased an underlying RP policy. In other
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words, cotton growers can benefit from the STAX premium subsidy even if STAX
provides little additional risk protection. Moreover, under subsidized premiums, when
comparing 70 percent RP layered with STAX to 80 percent RP, findings suggest that
growers will be better off reducing the RP coverage level and layering it with STAX.
Increasing RP coverage from 70 to 80 percent increases certainty equivalent gains for RP
but decreases certainty equivalent gains for STAX purchased as a complement to RP.
This decrease is due to the reduction in the layer of losses covered by STAX as the RP
coverage level increases.
When analyzing farm-level impacts of federal crop insurance products,
researchers often utilize representative farm analyses where a single hypothetical farm is
considered to be representative of a region (e.g., a county). Often times, county average
yield data are used to represent historical yields for the representative farm. The
variability of county average yields will often be increased to reflect higher yield
variability at the farm level. The advantage of representative farm analysis is that county
average yield data are often available for many years (approximately 60 years of NASS
county yield data are available for many counties). The disadvantage of representative
farm analysis is that it cannot capture the heterogeneity of farm-level impacts within a
region. Since this study utilized actual farm yield data, it was possible to document the
heterogeneity of farm-level impacts however, the analysis was limited to the 10 years of
available farm yield data. The results from this study are consistent with those from
previous studies on area-based insurance products in suggesting that STAX performs
better (worse) for farms with yields that are more (less) correlated to county yields.
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The results presented here will be useful to policymakers, crop producers,
marketing advisors, banks or other financial institutions lending to growers, agricultural
insurance companies and agricultural economists investigating the performance of
insurance generally and shallow loss insurance products, in particular. However, the
limited years of data and the fact that the analysis was only for three states could limit the
extent to which these findings can be generalized. Also, STAX actually uses a 2-year
ahead out-of-sample estimate of expected county yield. But due to the limited years of
yield data available for this study, the expected county yield was calculated in-sample
which could cause the benefits of STAX to be overstated.
Future research could extend this work to other states and different time periods.
Also, while this study was limited to cotton, the methods used here could also be used to
analyze the performance of SCO for various other commodities. Further investigations
along these lines will help generalize research findings on shallow loss products in order
to provide better information to farmers, policymakers, and other interested parties
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Table A.1

Number of observations per county per state for Non-irrigated Cotton
State

Texas

County
Bailey
Borden
Briscoe
Calhoun
Cameron
Childress
Cochran
Collingsworth
Concho
Cottle
Crosby
Dawson
Dickens
Ellis
Fisher
Floyd
Fort Bend
Gaines
Garza
Glasscock
Hale
Hall
Haskell
Hockley
Howard
Jackson
Jim Wells
Jones
Kleberg
Knox
Lamb
Lubbock
Lynn
Martin
Matagorda
Midland
Mitchell
94

Farms
130
116
30
36
53
116
113
53
74
64
283
918
78
48
298
188
192
198
223
172
37
269
216
629
530
25
48
274
26
35
201
529
941
668
25
99
199

Table A.1 (continued)

Texas

Total

Motley
Navarro
Nolan
Nueces
Reagan
Refugio
Runnels
San Patricio
Scurry
Stonewall
Taylor
Terry
Tom Green
Wharton
Wilbarger
Willacy
Williamson
Yoakum

Calhoun
Coahoma
Leflore
Mississippi Montgomery
Tunica
Webster
Yazoo
Total
Avoyelles
Catahoula
Concordia
Louisiana
East Carroll
Madison
Rapides
Tensas
Total

95

89
38
197
379
45
92
195
515
199
35
37
497
255
223
66
159
46
139
11340
28
28
20
16
26
37
15
170
23
59
67
16
35
16
42
258

Table A.2

Number of observations per county per state for irrigated Cotton
State

Texas

Total

Mississippi

Total

Louisiana

Total

County
Bailey
Briscoe
Castro
Cochran
Crosby
Dawson
Floyd
Gaines
Garza
Glasscock
Hale
Hall
Haskell
Hockley
Knox
Lamb
Lubbock
Lynn
Martin
Parmer
Reagan
Swisher
Terry
Tom Green
Yoakum
Coahoma
Leflore
Morehouse

96

Farms
109
98
130
181
473
253
602
302
72
113
894
57
38
628
83
517
891
474
58
87
30
205
439
102
145
6981
20
20
40
20
20

Table A.3
Treatments
Initial
treatment

80% RP
treatment
CRRA=3
treatment

Subsidy
treatment

Synthesis of the different treatments for Non-irrigated Cotton in each state
Texas
11340
0.020
(0.011)
0.010
(0.006)
0.006
(0.003)
0.022
(0.012)
0.003
(0.001)
0.030
(0.018)
0.015
(0.009)
0.008
(0.004)
0.054
(0.022)
0.050
(0.014)
0.042
(0.012)

Farmers
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

Mississippi
170
0.009
(0.009)
0.010
(0.005)
0.008
(0.003)
0.013
(0.009)
0.004
(0.001)
0.013
(0.014)
0.015
(0.008)
0.011
(0.004)
0.022
(0.017)
0.060
(0.009)
0.056
(0.008)

Louisiana
258
0.034
(0.019)
0.021
(0.007)
0.009
(0.002)
0.039
(0.020)
0.005
(0.001)
0.058
(0.034)
0.034
(0.014)
0.013
(0.003)
0.062
(0.028)
0.059
(0.009)
0.043
(0.005)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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Table A.4
Treatments
Initial
treatment

80% RP
treatment
CRRA=3
treatment

Subsidy
treatment

Synthesis of the different treatments for irrigated Cotton in each state
Texas
6981
0.035
(0.022)
0.010
(0.008)
0.005
(0.003)
0.040
(0.023)
0.003
(0.002)
0.057
(0.037)
0.016
(0.014)
0.007
(0.005)
0.073
(0.039)
0.054
(0.016)
0.044
(0.012)

Farmers
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***
Av. ∆ CE_RP*

Av. ∆ CE_STAX**

Av. ∆ CE_RP_STAX***

Mississippi
40
0.010
(0.006)
0.012
(0.003)
0.007
(0.002)
0.014
(0.006)
0.004
(0.001)
0.017
(0.010)
0.018
(0.005)
0.010
(0.003)
0.022
(0.010)
0.051
(0.010)
0.045
(0.011)

Louisiana
20
0.013
(0.005)
0.014
(0.002)
0.008
(0.001)
0.017
(0.005)
0.004
(0.001)
0.020
(0.008)
0.021
(0.004)
0.011
(0.002)
0.028
(0.008)
0.051
(0.002)
0.044
(0.001)

Standard deviation in parentheses
*Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with Revenue
Protection
** Average change from the certainty equivalent with no insurance to the certainty equivalent with STAX
***Average change from the certainty equivalent with Revenue Protection to the certainty equivalent with
STAX added to Revenue Protection
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APPENDIX B
FIGURES
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Figure B.1

Counties location and number of observations in Texas for non-irrigated
Cotton

Figure B.2

Counties location and number of observations in Texas for irrigated Cotton
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Figure B.3

Counties location and number of observations in Mississippi for nonirrigated Cotton

Figure B.4

Counties location and number of observations in Mississippi for irrigated
Cotton
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Figure B.5

Counties location and number of observations in Louisiana for nonirrigated Cotton

Figure B.6

Counties location and number of observations in Louisiana for irrigated
Cotton
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Figure B.7

STAX Certainty equivalent changes for Non-irrigated cotton in Texas
under the initial treatment

Notes: The first category includes some negative values
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